Otuo v The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of Britain

Disapplication of the one-year limitation period for defamation claims is exceptional. The court must balance the prejudice to the claimant against the prejudice to the defendant, having regard to all the circumstances, especially the length and reasons for delay and the effect of delay on evidence. The claimant bears the burden of showing that it is equitable to allow the action to proceed. A short period of delay does not by itself justify relief. The court may also consider the apparent strength of the claim, including an apparent defence of qualified privilege. The absence of demonstrated evidential prejudice to the defendant is relevant but not decisive.

The claimant alleged that an announcement at a Jehovah's Witnesses congregation conveyed defamatory innuendoes about his conduct. He issued proceedings one day outside the one-year limitation period for slander. A Master struck out the claim as time-barred. An appeal to Sir David Eady was dismissed, but the claimant's application under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 was directed to be heard by a judge, together with an unopposed amendment application.

The issue was whether it was equitable to disapply the limitation period, having regard to the claimant's explanation for delay, the prejudice to both parties, the apparent strength of the claim and the evidential consequences of allowing it to proceed.

1. The application was dismissed. The claimant had not shown sufficient reason to disapply the one-year limitation period under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980. Consequential orders were to be addressed after submissions.
2. The discretion under section 32A is largely unfettered, but it must be exercised by balancing prejudice to the claimant and defendant in all the circumstances. Particular attention is required for the length and reasons for delay and the availability and cogency of evidence. The claimant bears the burden of establishing a case for relief.
3. Defamation claims attract special considerations because reputation is ordinarily vindicated by prompt proceedings. The uniquely short limitation period explains why disapplication is commonly regarded as exceptional. The claimant's failure to complain about the alleged slander during the limitation period materially weakened his explanation.
4. The claimant's asserted lack of legal awareness did not justify relief. He knew the words, their alleged meaning and the circumstances of publication. After obtaining legal advice, he still had nearly three weeks to issue proceedings and had no convincing reason for waiting.
5. The court could take account of the apparent strength of the claim, including the prima facie qualified-privilege defence arising from the claimant's pleaded innuendo case. The fact that the defendant had not shown particular evidential prejudice was relevant under section 32A(2)(c), but it was not decisive.
6. The amendment application was not opposed, but refusal to disapply limitation meant that the limitation defence was bound to succeed and the action would consequently fall to be dismissed.

• High Court (Queen's Bench Division): the application under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 was dismissed.
• Earlier procedural decisions: Master Leslie struck out the claim as issued out of time. Sir David Eady dismissed the appeal on 12 December and directed that the outstanding section 32A application be listed before a judge.