Fateh-Saleh v The Regional Court of Lille, France

Under section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, extradition will be oppressive because of suicide risk only where the requested person’s mental condition removes his capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide and the risk remains sufficiently substantial notwithstanding proper protective arrangements. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, an EU requesting state is ordinarily presumed capable of providing appropriate custodial care. The burden lies on the requested person to show otherwise.

Article 8 requires a proportionality assessment. The public interest in extradition is weighty, and family-life consequences must be exceptionally severe before they displace that interest. Children’s best interests are a primary consideration, but they do not automatically determine the outcome.

The appellant appealed under section 26(1) of the Extradition Act 2003 against a Westminster Magistrates’ Court decision ordering his extradition to France pursuant to a conviction European Arrest Warrant. He had been convicted in absentia of participation in a criminal organisation and facilitating unauthorised entry and residence, and was entitled to a retrial in France.

He relied on serious depression, a history of self-harm and suicide attempts, and expert evidence assessing the risk of suicide as very high if extradited and separated from his family. He argued that extradition would be oppressive under section 25 and disproportionate under article 8. The central issues were whether the statutory oppression threshold was met and whether the interference with family life outweighed the public interest in extradition.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge had been entitled to order extradition.
2. For section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003, the court must assess the requested person’s mental condition, the risk of suicide, whether the condition removes his capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide, and the effectiveness of protective arrangements in the requesting state. The threshold is high.
3. The District Judge accepted the appellant’s history and the psychologist’s evidence, including the substantial risk of an attempted suicide. However, he was entitled to find that the appellant retained the capacity to resist the impulse. That finding meant that the relevant oppression threshold was not met.
4. Under Wolkowicz v Polish Judicial Authority [2013] EWHC 102 (Admin) and Cogan v Provincial Court of Almeria [2015] EWHC 89 (Admin), an EU requesting state is ordinarily presumed capable of preventing suicide and providing appropriate care, absent strong evidence to the contrary. The appellant had produced no expert evidence concerning French prisons, psychiatric facilities or family-contact arrangements. The District Judge was therefore entitled to rely on that presumption.
5. Article 8 required balancing the appellant’s and his family’s rights against the weighty public interest in extradition. Following Norris v Government of United States of America (No.2) [2010] UKSC 9 and H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25, family-life consequences normally have to be exceptionally severe before they outweigh extradition. The children’s best interests were a primary consideration, but the evidence of the appellant’s parenting role was limited.
6. The appellant’s precarious immigration position reduced the weight of the asserted obstacles to re-entry into the United Kingdom. His family circumstances did not displace the United Kingdom’s treaty obligations or the public interest in extradition for serious organised criminal activity.
7. Applying the appellate review approach described in Belbin v Regional Court of Lille, France [2015] EWHC 149 (Admin), there was no legal error, irrational factual finding or failure to consider a relevant factor. Extradition was neither oppressive nor disproportionate.

1. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge McPhee ordered the appellant’s extradition to France on 12 January 2015.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26(1) of the Extradition Act 2003 was dismissed.