Smech Properties Ltd, R (on the application of) v Runnymede Borough Council & Ors

A planning decision is unlawful where an officer’s report significantly misleads the committee about a material matter which remains uncorrected. Alternative sites are not automatically material in every planning application. Their consideration is legally required only where statute or planning policy imposes a positive obligation; otherwise relevance is a matter of planning judgment. A housing shortfall must be assessed initially against full objectively assessed need until a local plan establishes a constrained requirement. A shortfall does not, by itself, establish very special circumstances for development in the Green Belt. Where a material error is established, the court may nevertheless decline to quash permission if it is inevitable that the authority would have reached the same decision after being properly advised.

The claimant, owner of the Longcross Estate, challenged planning permission granted by Runnymede Borough Council for a large mixed-use development at the former DERA North site. The site was within the Metropolitan Green Belt and the proposal included employment uses, a data centre and 200 dwellings.

The challenge was ultimately confined to three issues: whether the officer’s report misdirected the committee on alternative sites; whether it misstated the five-year housing land supply; and whether the application should have been referred back to committee after an inspector reported on the emerging Local Plan Core Strategy.

1. Alternative sites. The claim on this ground failed. There was no provision in the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 or planning policy which compelled consideration of alternative sites. The relevance of alternatives was therefore a matter of planning judgment. The committee was determining a large mixed-use proposal as a whole, not merely its residential component. The officer’s advice was reasonable in the circumstances.
2. Five-year housing supply. This ground succeeded. Under paragraphs 47–49 of the NPPF, the starting point was full objectively assessed housing need until the emerging plan produced a constrained figure. The relevant figure was 595 dwellings per annum, not the untested figure of 220. On either basis, however, the DERA housing was not the necessary tipping point for a five-year supply. The report therefore materially misdirected members by stating that the Council could demonstrate a five-year supply only if the application site were included.
3. Failure to return the application to committee. This ground failed. The Local Plan Inspector’s report was a new consideration, but it concerned strategic plan-making and borough-wide housing provision. It did not address whether very special circumstances existed for this individual application. Objectively, it would not have tipped the planning balance.
4. Relief. The court exercised its discretion not to quash the permission. Proper advice would have revealed a greater housing shortfall, while the site’s deliverability, railway access and previously developed character remained. It was inevitable that the Council would have reached the same decision. Submissions on the final order and costs were invited.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The court refused to quash the planning permission despite finding a material misdirection concerning housing land supply.