Owens & Anor v Grose & Anor

Communications made to a letting agent or deposit-dispute body about the retention of a tenancy deposit may attract qualified privilege where they are connected with the dispute. The privilege can extend to material addressing the parties’ conduct and related allegations, even if parts of the communication are of marginal relevance. A claim will succeed at summary judgment where there is no evidence fit to be tried that the defendant knowingly made false statements, included irrelevant defamatory matter to vent spite, or acted for an improper purpose. A defamation claim will not be struck out as a Jameel abuse where a serious allegation could justify a trial and meaningful vindication. Conversely, proceedings serving no practical purpose may be abusive.

The claimants sued the defendants in defamation over a letter concerning the condition of a rented property, damage, cleaning, the tenancy deposit, and an allegation that the first claimant had improperly used company resources. The letter was sent to the letting agents and later to the deposit-dispute service.

Master Kay QC dismissed the defendants’ applications to strike out the claim or obtain reverse summary judgment. The defendants appealed. The issues included qualified privilege, malice, abuse of process under Jameel, responsibility for publication to the deposit-dispute service, and the second claimant’s individual claim.

1. The appeal was allowed to the extent that reverse summary judgment was granted to the defendants. Both claims were dismissed.
2. The publications to the letting agents and the deposit-dispute service were made on occasions of qualified privilege. Each recipient had a duty or interest in receiving material connected with the tenancy-deposit dispute. The whole letter was sufficiently connected because it responded to the claim that sums should not be retained from the deposit.
3. The privilege was not defeated by any realistic prospect of proving malice. The evidence showed a heated dispute in which both sides had made exaggerated or illogical assertions. Falsity alone did not establish malice. There was no evidence fit to be tried that the defendants knowingly made untrue statements, deliberately introduced irrelevant defamatory matter to vent spite, or acted for an improper purpose. The allegation concerning company resources was mistaken and unjustifiable, but the evidence did not show knowing dishonesty.
4. The court nevertheless considered that the serious allegation about the first claimant’s use of company resources would have justified a trial if the claim had otherwise been viable. Such a claim would not have been a Jameel abuse merely because publication was limited.
5. The second claimant’s claim, considered separately, would have served no practical purpose and was abusive. The issue of the defendants’ responsibility for publication to the deposit-dispute service remained fit for trial, but became immaterial once qualified privilege was established.
6. Late witness statements from both sides were admitted. The first claimant’s statement would not have altered the result.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): allowed the defendants’ appeal from Master Kay QC’s refusal of strike-out and reverse-summary-judgment applications. Reverse summary judgment was granted and both claims were dismissed.
• Master Kay QC: dismissed the defendants’ applications, leaving the claims to proceed to trial.