McLaughlin & Ors v London Borough of Lambeth & Anor

An individual who is personally referred to and defamed may sue, even where the publication concerns the management of a governmental body. The Derbyshire v Times Newspapers Limited principle does not impose a general bar on such claims. A claim should be struck out as an abuse only where that conclusion is clear and obvious. Limited publication and modest damage do not, without more, establish abuse where the claim offers a realistic prospect of vindication or protection against republication. However, irrelevant and disproportionate allegations may be removed by case management without striking out the action as a whole.

The claimants, who held senior positions at a maintained primary school, sued the local authority and its chief internal auditor for libel arising from three emails concerning the school’s management. They also claimed under Article 8 of the Convention and the Human Rights Act 1998. The defendants applied under CPR 3.4(2)(b), alleging that the proceedings circumvented the Derbyshire principle, pursued a collateral purpose, and involved no real or substantial tort. An alternative summary judgment application was not pursued. The central issues were whether the individual claims were barred or abusive, and whether limited publication and the prospect of small damage justified striking them out.

1. Application dismissed. The claim was not suitable for strike-out on the basis that it circumvented the Derbyshire principle. The court should strike out only where it is clearly and obviously right to do so, particularly where the applicable law is unclear.
2. The reasoning in Derbyshire v Times Newspapers Limited contemplated that an individual responsible for the day-to-day management of a governmental body could sue where the publication referred to and defamed that individual. No general principle precluded an individual from suing merely because the impugned conduct occurred in the course of official functions.
3. The claimants’ pleaded meanings were not so confined to official activities as to permit the issue to be determined summarily. It was at least arguable that allegations of financial impropriety could engage personal integrity and private life for Article 8 purposes.
4. An ulterior motive does not itself constitute abuse. Abuse requires misuse of the court’s process to obtain an impermissible collateral advantage or to impose burdens beyond those ordinarily arising from properly conducted litigation. Only the clearest cases justify preliminary strike-out.
5. The limited number of publishees and the possibility that the damage already suffered was small did not establish that there was no real or substantial tort. The claim included a defence of justification, a claim for a declaration under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and an arguable risk of republication of electronically stored material. Vindication includes preventing or reducing future publication.
6. The allegations concerning a wider campaign involving officers other than the second defendant were irrelevant and disproportionate to the pleaded case of vicarious liability. They could be removed or confined through pleading and case-management orders, but their presence did not justify striking out the whole claim.
7. The defendants’ application therefore failed. Further argument was invited on managing the case so that only relevant and proportionate issues were tried.