Al Sadik (aka Riad Tawfiq Mahmood Al Sadek aka Riad Tawfik Sadik) v Sadik

Section 9 of the Defamation Act 2013 creates a statutory jurisdictional bar which cannot be waived by failing to use CPR Part 11. Serious harm under s 1 requires consideration of the actual or likely impact of publication, combining the inherent tendency of the words with their impact on recipients. Inferences may be drawn from the gravity, audience, targeting and circulation of the publication. A defamation claim involving a real and substantial tort should be struck out as a Jameel abuse only exceptionally.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning three WhatsApp messages sent by the defendant to 34 members of their wider family after contentious property litigation. The messages alleged that the claimant had dishonestly arranged to rob his brother’s house, lied after swearing on the Quran and committed perjury.

The defendant applied to strike out the claim under CPR r 3.4(2), or for summary judgment under CPR r 24.2. She argued that the court lacked jurisdiction under s 9 of the Defamation Act 2013, that the publication had not caused serious harm under s 1, and that the claim was an abuse of process.

1. The applications were dismissed. On summary judgment, the court must assess whether the claimant has a realistic prospect of success, avoid a mini-trial and consider evidence reasonably expected to be available at trial: Attrill v Dresdner Kleinwort and another [2011] EWCA Civ 229; ED&F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472; Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 3.
2. Section 9 of the Defamation Act 2013 imposes a statutory subject-matter jurisdictional bar. It cannot be waived by submission, consent or failure to comply with CPR Part 11: Hoddinott v Persimmon Homes (Wessex) Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 806; IMS SA v Capital Oil & Gas Industries Ltd [2016] 4 WLR 163. The claimant had a realistic prospect of proving that the defendant was domiciled in the UK.
3. Residence is a question of fact and degree. A person may reside in more than one jurisdiction. The inquiry concerns the settled or usual place of abode, the quality of occupation, the pattern of life and the permanence or continuity of the connection: Levene v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1928] AC 217; Varsani v Relfo Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 560; Bestolov v Povarenkin [2017] EWHC 1968 (Comm).
4. Following Lachaux v Independent Print Limited [2019] 3 WLR 18, serious harm must be established as actual or likely harm in fact. Direct evidence from recipients is unnecessary where reasonable inferences can be drawn from the gravity of the allegations, the religious context, the targeted family audience, the claimant’s reputation and onward dissemination.
5. The Jameel jurisdiction is exceptional. The court considers the legitimate value of the proceedings, including vindication, against the likely costs and use of court procedures. The claim had a realistic prospect of establishing a real and substantial tort, and was not abusive: Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946; Ames v Spamhaus Project Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 3409; Alsaifi v Trinity Mirror Plc [2019] EMLR 1.

First instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.