Varsani v Relfo Ltd (In Liquidation)

An individual may have more than one usual residence for service of a claim form under rule 6.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. Whether premises constitute a residence is a question of fact and degree. Whether they are a usual residence depends on the defendant’s settled pattern of life, assessed qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

The court should consider the nature, regularity and continuity of the defendant’s use of the premises. The duration of occupation is relevant but not decisive. Premises regularly used to stay with a family permanently living there may constitute a usual residence even though the defendant works and spends most of the year abroad.

Relfo Ltd, in liquidation, brought English proceedings against Bhimji Jadva Velji Varsani concerning money allegedly transferred in breach of fiduciary duty. It left the claim form with Varsani’s father at a house in Edgware jointly owned by Varsani and his wife, where his wife, children and other close relatives lived. Varsani worked and lived for most of each year in Kenya but regularly stayed at the Edgware property.

A deputy High Court judge dismissed Varsani’s application under Part 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. He held that Relfo had a good arguable case that the Edgware property was Varsani’s usual residence and, alternatively, his last known residence under rule 6.9. The appeal was confined to whether service at that property was valid.

1. Appeal dismissed. Etherton LJ held that the claim form had been properly served at the Edgware property because it was a usual residence of the appellant for the purposes of rule 6.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. Elias LJ and the Chancellor agreed.

2. Whether a person resides at particular premises is a question of fact and degree. The appellant jointly owned the property with his wife. His wife, children, parents and sister lived there permanently, and he stayed there every year for appreciable periods when his work permitted. He had also described it in court documents as his residence and home. Although those descriptions were not conclusive, they were highly material. Taken together, the circumstances established that the property was his family home and that he resided there.

3. A person may have more than one usual residence. The contrast in rule 6.9(2) between an individual’s “usual” residence and a business or corporation’s “principal” place or office supported that conclusion. “Usual residence” did not require a predominantly quantitative comparison between the time spent at different properties.

4. The critical inquiry was the defendant’s settled pattern of life. The court was entitled to consider the nature or quality of the use, its regularity and continuity, and the permanent occupation of the premises by the defendant’s family. Regular annual stays at a family home could therefore make it a usual residence even where the defendant spent most of the year working abroad. The approach in Levene v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1928] AC 217, which rejected mere counting of days and examined how a person’s life was usually ordered, supported that analysis.

5. The cases concerning Deripaska and Abramovich were materially different. Their use of London properties was principally connected with business or other intermittent purposes, and the relevant properties did not have the same character as settled family homes.

6. It was unnecessary to decide whether the property also qualified as the appellant’s last known residence. Etherton LJ identified difficulties in the operation of rule 6.9(3)–(6) where a defendant continues to reside at more than one address and suggested that the Civil Procedure Rule Committee should consider them.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed in [2010] EWCA Civ 560. The court upheld the conclusion that the claim form was validly served at the appellant’s usual residence.
2. High Court, Chancery Division: Jules Sher QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, dismissed the appellant’s application to challenge jurisdiction, set aside service or stay the proceedings. No neutral citation for that decision is stated.