Mobile Telecommunications Company KSCP v HRH Prince Hussam Bin Saud Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

For bankruptcy jurisdiction under Insolvency Act 1986, a debtor must have had a meaningful place of residence in England and Wales during the statutory period. Residence requires more than temporary occupation or permission to stay in another person’s property. The court examines the whole evidence, including the debtor’s pattern of life, purpose, degree and continuity of occupation, control, possessions, and objectively assessed intention. A person may have more than one residence and may cease to have a particular residence. The statutory test is fact-sensitive and requires a sufficient connection with the jurisdiction to justify subjecting the debtor to English bankruptcy law.

The petitioner sought a bankruptcy adjudication against the respondent in respect of debts arising from arbitral awards. Earlier High Court decisions had concluded, on a good arguable case basis, that the respondent had a place of residence in England and Wales. At trial, the court reconsidered the issue on all the evidence and on the balance of probabilities.

The principal question was whether, between 1 June 2019 and 1 June 2022, the respondent had a place of residence in England and Wales within section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986, particularly at York House or within a group of London properties owned or used by family members.

1. Statutory test. Section 265(2)(b)(i) of the Insolvency Act 1986 requires proof that, at some time in the three years before presentation of the petition, the debtor had a place of residence in England and Wales. The expression is not a term of art.
2. Meaning of residence. The court adopted the established guidance that residence involves a settled purpose and some degree of permanence, continuity or expectation of continuity. Temporary presence, short stays and mere occupation are insufficient. The inquiry is directed to the quality of the debtor’s residence, not merely to an entitlement to occupy property. Authorities including Re Brauch [1978] Ch 316, Fox v Stirk [1970] 2 QB 463, Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Su [2021] Bus LR 1285 and Varsani v Relfo [2010] EWCA Civ 560 supported that approach.
3. Fact and degree. The court must assess all the evidence, including the debtor’s pattern of life, purpose of visits, actual occupation, control, possessions, relationship with the property and objectively assessed intention. A person may have more than one residence, but may also give up a residence and later acquire another.
4. Application. The respondent had resided at York House while studying in London between approximately 1982 and 1990. He then returned permanently to Saudi Arabia. Thereafter his London visits were infrequent, short and undertaken for specific purposes. He kept no possessions there, had no meaningful control, required permission to stay and generally used hotels. Registration for council tax was arranged administratively by a family employee without his knowledge and did not establish residence.
5. Conclusion. Neither York House nor the New London Properties constituted the respondent’s place of residence during the relevant period. The evidence did not establish the sufficient connection required by section 265. The petition was dismissed. The parties were invited to agree an order.

Earlier applications concerning service and jurisdiction were determined by Deputy ICC Judge Schaffer, Roth J, ICC Judge Barber and Bacon J, including [2020] EWHC 3517 (Ch), [2022] EWHC 744 (Ch), [2023] EWHC 1144 (Ch) and [2024] EWHC 1724 (Ch). Those decisions were made on interlocutory or good arguable case bases. The present court reconsidered jurisdiction at trial on the balance of probabilities and dismissed the petition.