ArcelorMittal Point Lisas Limited v Steel Workers Union of Trinidad and Tobago

Under the Industrial Relations Act 1972, a person supplied under a labour-only contract is deemed to be employed by the person receiving the services. Registered collective agreements then apply to that worker as part of the relevant bargaining unit, with their terms treated as terms of the individual employment contract.

An Industrial Court may determine the application of a registered agreement where the substance of that relief appears from the pleadings, even if the relevant statutory subsection is not expressly cited. It may make consequential orders covering successive agreements in a continuing dispute. The court may also award interest on sums due, without a pleaded claim for interest, provided natural justice is observed.

The appellant operated a steel-producing business and used contractors whose employees worked alongside its own bargaining-unit workers. The respondent was the recognised majority union. It applied to the Industrial Court for the appellant to be deemed the employer of persons working under labour-only contracts and for the relevant collective agreements to apply to them.

In 2009 the Industrial Court deemed 80 contract workers to be employed by the appellant and ordered application of the appropriate collective agreements, with interest on sums due. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal in 2011. The issues before the Board were whether the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to make those orders, whether an agreement had limited the case to statutory interpretation, whether expired collective agreements could be applied, whether natural justice had been denied, and whether interest could be awarded.

1. Disposition. The Board, delivering a single judgment through Lord Clarke, unanimously dismissed the appeal.
2. Under section 2(4)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 1972, where a person engages a worker’s services to provide them to another, that other person is deemed to be the employer under a labour-only contract. The unappealed finding that the employment agencies engaged the workers to provide services to the appellant therefore made the appellant their statutory employer.
3. By section 47(2), the terms of a registered collective agreement are deemed to be terms of the individual employment contracts of workers comprised from time to time in the relevant bargaining unit. That consequence applied to workers deemed to be employed under section 2(4)(b). The agreements were therefore applicable to the contract workers.
4. The union’s Statement of Evidence and Arguments sought both a declaration of employment status and an order applying the collective agreement. Under sections 9(1) and 16(2), the Industrial Court could determine the substance of that application without requiring an express reference to section 16(2). The complaint was continuing, and the court could order application of appropriate successive agreements under section 10(1)(b), having regard to section 10(3)(b). The latter provision governed the exercise of existing powers and was not a freestanding source of jurisdiction.
5. The employer had notice that application of the collective agreements was sought. The claim had not been abandoned or contractually confined to the statutory interpretation issue. The consequential order therefore did not breach natural justice.
6. The Industrial Court also had power to award interest. It was a court of record under section 4(1), sums due under an agreement were deemed damages under section 10(7), and section 25 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act authorised interest. The authorities supported the conclusion that neither a claim for interest nor its supporting facts needed to be pleaded.
7. The Board did not need to decide whether jurisdiction could determine breaches occurring during the currency of an agreement after that agreement had expired. It nevertheless indicated that, as presently advised, section 16(2) would permit that course. The jurisdiction objection was in any event barred by section 18(2)(a), since it had not been formally taken before the Industrial Court.
8. The order remained broad. Its practical application, including the sums due and any possible set-off for superior contractor benefits, could be addressed through further discussions and the statutory procedures, including section 16(1) where interpretation of the order was disputed.

• Privy Council: in [2015] UKPC 36, unanimously dismissed the appeal.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: on 9 December 2011 dismissed the appellant’s appeal and upheld the Industrial Court’s order.
• Industrial Court of Trinidad and Tobago: on 31 July 2009 deemed 80 contract workers to be employed by the appellant and ordered application of the appropriate collective agreements, with interest.