Gibson v Douglas & Anor

An appellate court should not decide an important legal question that is unnecessary to dispose of an appeal. Where police physically remove a licensee, a person who is merely present and acts as a conduit for the occupier’s wishes is not thereby a joint tortfeasor; evidence of conduct capable of creating joint liability is required. Where a licence specifies no period, revocation entitles the licensee to a reasonable time in all the circumstances to remove himself and his possessions. The period is fact-sensitive and cannot be defined more precisely. It may be minutes for an unwanted visitor, or years in some long-occupation cases, while weeks may be appropriate in a case of this kind.

Thomas Gibson claimed damages against Lillian Douglas and Ian Douglas for alleged unlawful eviction from Lillian Douglas’s property and for possessions allegedly appropriated, destroyed or disposed of. The eviction occurred while Lillian Douglas was in hospital with advanced vascular dementia; police physically removed Gibson after she indicated that she did not want him to return while he remained at the property.

Gibson’s claim against Lillian Douglas was compromised for £5. His claim against Ian Douglas proceeded in the Liverpool County Court. Judge Wood QC treated Gibson as a licensee whose rights to remain were extremely limited, and dismissed the claim on a half-time submission, finding that Ian Douglas had acted only as a conduit and had not participated sufficiently in the eviction.

Permission to appeal was limited to whether a licensee could lawfully be evicted without notice, with a possible issue under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal instead considered whether Ian Douglas could be liable on the evidence and whether it was necessary to determine the notice question.

Appeal dismissed. Sir James Munby gave the judgment and Lord Justice Briggs agreed.

1. The appeal could be disposed of on the narrow ground advanced for Ian Douglas. Judge Wood found that the police effected the physical removal, Ian Douglas merely attended, and he acted as a conduit for his mother’s wishes. Nothing in the evidence or judgment showed conduct capable of making him a joint tortfeasor with Lillian Douglas or the police. Mere presence and the communication of the occupier’s wishes were insufficient.
2. Because Gibson’s claim against Ian Douglas failed on that basis, the court declined to decide whether notice was required to revoke the licence or whether Gibson had been given inadequate time to pack and leave. The potentially important legal question identified when permission was granted was therefore unnecessary to the result.
3. The court nevertheless stated the common-law position as an observation. Where the licence specifies no relevant period, a licensee is entitled, following revocation, to whatever time is reasonable in all the circumstances to remove himself and his possessions: Minister of Health v Bellotti [1944] KB 298. The principle could not be defined with greater precision, and attempting to do so would be undesirable.
4. The period is fact-sensitive. An unwanted visitor admitted through the front door and then told to leave may have only minutes: Robson v Hallett [1967] 2 QB 939. A licensee occupying an ancestral home for about ten years may have two years: Parker v Parker [2003] EWHC 1846 (Ch). In a case such as the present, weeks might typically be more appropriate than months or years, but no period was determined.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 8 December 2016, the court dismissed the appeal. Permission had been limited to the question whether a licensee could lawfully be evicted without notice: [2016] EWCA Civ 1266.
• Liverpool County Court — His Honour Judge Wood QC dismissed Gibson’s claim against Ian Douglas on 14 March 2014 on a half-time submission, finding that Ian Douglas had not participated in the eviction so as to incur liability.