MA (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In asylum cases, a duty to investigate disputed documents arises only in the limited circumstances identified in PJ (Sri Lanka). The reference to investigation occurring exceptionally describes the rarity of such cases and does not impose an exceptional-case threshold. The decision-maker should ask whether the document is central to the protection claim and whether a simple inquiry would conclusively resolve its authenticity and reliability. Even where both conditions are present, the evidence must be considered as a whole and a duty does not automatically arise. Anxious scrutiny informs this approach but does not create a general obligation to verify documents.

MA and AM, both Bangladeshi nationals, challenged adverse asylum decisions concerning disputed documentary evidence. MA appealed against the Upper Tribunal’s decision, which had set aside and remade the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on a limited Article 8 point but dismissed the remaining grounds. AM appealed against Andrews J’s refusal of permission to apply for judicial review of the refusal of permission to appeal. The conjoined appeals raised the common issue whether the authorities were required to verify documents relied upon in support of asylum claims, and whether the lower decisions lacked anxious scrutiny.

Both appeals dismissed. Lloyd Jones LJ gave the judgment of the court; Davis and Underhill LJJ agreed.

1. The court treated PJ (Sri Lanka) as binding. Its reference to investigation being required only exceptionally describes the rarity of the duty, not a legal threshold that the case itself must be exceptional.
2. The applicable inquiry is sequential. The decision-maker should first consider whether the disputed document is at the centre of the request for protection. It should then consider whether a simple inquiry would conclusively resolve authenticity and reliability. Satisfaction of those conditions may make an inquiry necessary, but does not automatically create a duty. The documentary evidence must be assessed with the evidence as a whole.
3. This approach reconciles Tanveer Ahmed with Singh v Belgium. Singh concerned an exceptional situation in which documents central to the protection claim could readily be checked with an unimpeachable source. It did not establish a general verification obligation.
4. In MA’s case, the documents concerning his alleged conviction were potentially important, but verification might have been difficult and inconclusive. His wider conduct, including remaining in Bangladesh, travelling on his own passport, failing to claim asylum earlier and applying for a new Bangladeshi passport, compellingly undermined the genuineness of his claim. The Secretary of State therefore had no duty to make further inquiries.
5. In AM’s case, the newspaper reports were peripheral. They had limited probative value, did not establish that he organised the demonstration or was charged, and could not justify verification. The First-tier Tribunal had applied Tanveer Ahmed correctly.
6. Anxious scrutiny informs the approach but does not require verification or require documents to be given weight merely because they have not been checked. The alleged lack of anxious scrutiny therefore failed in both appeals.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — The conjoined appeals were dismissed: [2016] EWCA Civ 175.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) — MA’s appeal was allowed only to the extent that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to consider his Article 8 claim generally; the decision was set aside and remade, and the remaining grounds were dismissed. AM’s application for permission to appeal was refused.
3. Administrative Court, Queen’s Bench Division — Andrews J refused AM permission to apply for judicial review on 30 June 2014.
4. First-tier Tribunal — MA’s appeal was dismissed on 27 June 2013. AM’s appeal was dismissed on 17 March 2014.