Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A tribunal's reasons may be legally adequate even where a conclusion is expressed briskly or by generalised reference, provided the appellate tribunal identifies the evidential basis and explains why the conclusion is sustainable. A rule governing applications for leave to remain cannot ordinarily govern an earlier application or be treated as directly applicable to a later removal decision without regard to the procedural context. Any failure to address the rule is immaterial where the findings make its requirements impossible to satisfy. Permission for a second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason.

The applicant, a Bangladeshi national, had applied in 2009 for leave to remain on Article 8 grounds. The application was refused, with no right of appeal because he lacked leave. After being served with a removal decision in July 2013, he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal. The Upper Tribunal dismissed a further appeal and refused permission to appeal. Permission was also refused on the papers by Underhill LJ. The applicant renewed his application to the Court of Appeal, challenging the adequacy of the First-tier Tribunal's credibility reasons and its failure to address paragraph 276ADE(vi) of the Immigration Rules.

1. Renewed application. Sir Stephen Richards refused permission to appeal. Neither ground disclosed an important point of principle or practice, and there was no other compelling reason for an appeal.
2. Credibility reasons. The First-tier Tribunal had found the applicant not credible because his statements materially conflicted with his oral evidence and because his account of arrival was implausible. Although its rejection of the uncle's evidence was expressed somewhat brusquely, the Upper Tribunal identified the relevant contradictions in the statements. The reasons were therefore legally adequate under the standard raised by MK (Pakistan) [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC).
3. Paragraph 276ADE(vi). The subparagraph could not apply to the 2009 application, because it came into force only on 9 July 2012. It also had no obvious direct application to the later removal decision, which was the decision under appeal. The provision had not been relied on before the First-tier Tribunal and, although raised before the Upper Tribunal, had not been pressed. The timing authorities cited by the applicant, including Edgehill [2014] EWCA Civ 402, Singh [2015] EWCA Civ 74 and Thomas [2015] EWCA Civ 856, were of doubtful relevance.
4. Materiality. Even if the First-tier Tribunal ought to have considered paragraph 276ADE(vi), its findings admitted of no sensible possibility that the applicant had no meaningful ties with Bangladesh. The alleged omission could not have affected the outcome.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): the renewed application for permission to appeal was refused: [2016] EWCA Civ 684.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): dismissed the further appeal and refused permission to appeal.
3. First-tier Tribunal: dismissed the applicant's appeal against the removal decision.