Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v Allen & Anor

A decision-maker who disagrees with a planning inspector must explain the disagreement fully and clearly. The governing standard remains whether the reasons are proper, adequate and intelligible; no heightened standard applies. Reasons suffice if the decision letter, read in context and with the inspector’s report, explains why the appeal was lost.

A predictive planning judgment may rely on an extant permission, enforceable planning obligations and evidence that acceptable accommodation will be delivered. The court will not interfere with a reasonable judgment merely because it differs from the inspector’s assessment.

Where refusal interferes with family life, children’s best interests must be treated as a primary consideration and weighed against the wider public interest.

The Secretary of State refused Mr Allen, a Romany gypsy, further temporary planning permission for a family and traveller caravan site. He disagreed with an inspector’s recommendation because he concluded that an authorised council site at Meadow Lane would provide sufficient suitable pitches.

On an application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, Gilbart J held that the Secretary of State had not adequately explained his disagreement and quashed the decision: [2015] EWHC 2463 (Admin).

The Secretary of State appealed. Mr Allen’s respondent’s notice alleged that the assessment of Meadow Lane was irrational and that insufficient regard had been given to article 8 rights and the children’s best interests. The central issues were the adequacy of the reasons, substantial prejudice, rationality and the treatment of the affected family’s human rights.

1. Appeal allowed. The Secretary of State’s reasons were proper, adequate and intelligible. Read with the relevant parts of the inspector’s report, the decision letter clearly explained why he concluded that Meadow Lane would meet the outstanding need for traveller pitches and why he refused a further temporary permission.

2. A Secretary of State who disagrees with an inspector must explain the disagreement fully and clearly. There is, however, no heightened standard of reasons. The adequacy of reasons depends on the circumstances. The decision letter must show why the appeal had the outcome it did, bearing in mind the parties’ knowledge of the issues: South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 and Horada v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 169 applied.

3. The Secretary of State had a proper evidential foundation for his predictive planning judgment. Meadow Lane had planning permission, conditions and a section 106 obligation requiring delivery. It would provide enough pitches for the five-year requirement. He was entitled to rely on the council’s commitments and evidence that acceptable living conditions would be provided. He was not required to reassess the planning merits of a development which already had permission.

4. The inspector had expressed doubt about the eventual quality of the Meadow Lane accommodation, but had not found it unsuitable. The Secretary of State rationally reached a firmer assessment on the same material. His conclusion was neither perverse, illogical nor unfair.

5. The Secretary of State gave significant weight to the family’s personal circumstances, recognised the children’s best interests as a primary consideration and acknowledged the interference with article 8 rights. He was entitled to balance those matters against the wider public interest. His assessment was focused, complete and consistent with the relevant domestic and Strasbourg principles.

6. Because the reasons were legally sufficient, substantial prejudice did not arise. The grounds in the respondent’s notice were rejected. Simon and Jackson LJJ agreed with Lindblom LJ.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and rejected the grounds in Mr Allen’s respondent’s notice: [2016] EWCA Civ 767.
2. Administrative Court, Planning Court: Gilbart J allowed Mr Allen’s application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, holding that the Secretary of State had failed to give adequate reasons: [2015] EWHC 2463 (Admin).