Murray v R.

A Lucas direction is required only where there is a real danger that a jury may treat a defendant’s lie as proof of guilt. The question depends on the circumstances of the individual case. A direction will usually be unnecessary where the alleged lie is bound up with the central issue for the jury and the ordinary directions on the burden and standard of proof adequately protect the defendant. It is particularly unnecessary where giving the direction would complicate a simple conflict of evidence. By contrast, a direction may be needed where the prosecution relies on a lie about a separate or peripheral matter as evidence of guilt.

The appellant was convicted unanimously in the Crown Court at Preston of rape, assault by penetration and sexual assault. The prosecution alleged that he had sexually assaulted a colleague in a secluded loading-bay area. CCTV showed them entering and leaving the area together.

He denied any sexual activity. His interview account and parts of his evidence conflicted with the CCTV evidence. The trial judge gave the ordinary directions on burden and standard of proof but no Lucas direction concerning the alleged lies.

On appeal, the appellant contended that the absence of a Lucas direction made his convictions unsafe. The central issue was whether the alleged lies were capable of being treated as evidence of guilt on a separate or peripheral issue.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions were safe. The ordinary direction on the burden and standard of proof was sufficient.

2. R v Lucas (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 159 establishes safeguards before a lie can support a prosecution case. The relevant principle is that a lie can assist only where the jury are sure that it was deliberate, material and not attributable to an innocent reason. A Lucas direction is therefore required only where there is a real danger that the jury will reason from a lie to guilt.

3. Following the guidance in R v Burge and R v Pegg [1996] 1 Cr. App. R 163, the court held that such a direction is not required merely because a defendant may have lied. The practical question is whether the prosecution relies on a lie about a separate and distinct matter as proof of guilt, or whether the judge can reasonably foresee that the jury may do so.

4. The appellant’s asserted lack of awareness of the complainant in the loading bay was inseparable from the central issue: whether he had sexually assaulted her there. It was neither a separate issue nor peripheral evidence of the kind considered in R v Anjum [2003] EWCA Crim 493. The interview assertion about arranging to meet was arguably less central, but the case was not left to the jury on the footing that deciding its truth would itself establish guilt.

5. No innocent explanation for any lie was identified other than speculation. In those circumstances, a Lucas direction would have confused and complicated the straightforward evidential conflict, consistently with R v Middleton unreported, 23 March 2000. Although trial counsel’s failure to seek a direction did not bar the appeal, it reinforced the conclusion that there was no real danger requiring one.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In Murray v R [2016] EWCA Crim 1051, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Preston — On 19 June 2014, the appellant was convicted unanimously of rape, assault by penetration and sexual assault, and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with ancillary orders.