Lindo, R. v

Voluntary acute intoxication from alcohol or drugs cannot, of itself, found the partial defence of diminished responsibility under section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957. A recognised medical condition is necessary, but is not invariably sufficient.

The court doubted that a drug-induced psychosis, whether alone or coupled with a prodromal state indicating only a risk of schizophrenia, could satisfy that statutory requirement where the drugs were voluntarily taken. In reviewing a conviction, directions must be read as a whole. A conviction is not unsafe where the jury were accurately directed on intent, the statutory elements and the burden of proof, notwithstanding an isolated omission from written steps to verdict.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of murdering a stranger by repeatedly striking him with a brick. He had pleaded guilty to manslaughter. He had voluntarily taken cannabis and a substance he believed to be MDMA but which contained ethylone. Psychiatric evidence described a drug-induced psychosis and a prodromal state for schizophrenia.

The jury rejected diminished responsibility and convicted by a majority of ten to one. On appeal, the appellant challenged the directions on intent and diminished responsibility. He also sought to adduce fresh psychiatric evidence after a later psychotic episode in prison. The central issues were whether the directions rendered the conviction unsafe and whether the fresh evidence could affect the verdict.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The judge’s directions on intent were correct and fair. The jury were told that the prosecution had to prove an intention to kill or cause really serious harm. Although intent was omitted from the written steps to verdict, the judge expressly corrected that omission and directed that an absence of proof of intent required an acquittal.

2. The amended section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 required the appellant to prove an abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognised medical condition, substantial impairment of one of the specified abilities, and an explanatory causal connection with the killing. The court applied R v Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281: voluntary acute intoxication remains incapable of founding diminished responsibility, notwithstanding the statutory amendment.

3. The court doubted whether there was evidence of a qualifying recognised medical condition. A drug-induced psychosis alone would not suffice. Nor did a drug-induced psychosis combined only with a prodromal state, meaning a risk rather than a diagnosis of schizophrenia, appear sufficient to engage the section. The court endorsed the public-policy reasoning in Woods [2008] EWCA Crim 1305: a person who voluntarily takes drugs ordinarily remains responsible for conduct caused by their effects.

4. In any event, the directions on diminished responsibility, considered as a whole and against the issues actually contested, left the defence to the jury as fairly and generously as possible. They repeatedly stated the statutory ingredients and the correct burden of proof. No greater elaboration on what could constitute a recognised medical condition would have assisted the appellant.

5. The proposed fresh evidence was not received. It depended on an assumption that the appellant had been drug-free when later symptoms occurred, despite admissions of drug use in prison. His treating doctors had not diagnosed schizophrenia, and the evidence did not establish that he had schizophrenia at the time of the killing. It added nothing material that could have affected the jury’s verdict.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction: [2016] EWCA Crim 1940.

• Central Criminal Court On 12 March 2015, convicted the appellant of murder by a majority of ten to one. He had previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter.