G, R. v

A reduction in sentence for a guilty plea is assessed by reference to the offender’s plea to the charges at the first reasonable opportunity. A sentencing judge may not reduce an otherwise appropriate guilty-plea discount because the offender had, years earlier, failed to admit the offending. Those earlier denials and their consequences are matters for the assessment of the appropriate starting point.

The former restraint on the criminal slip-rule power identified in earlier authority no longer governs in light of the Attorney General’s statutory power to refer unduly lenient sentences.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Plymouth to multiple sexual offences against his daughter, committed over a prolonged period while she was a child. The sentencing judge adopted a starting point of 24 years’ imprisonment and allowed a one-third reduction for the guilty pleas, imposing 16 years’ imprisonment.

Several weeks later, the judge used the slip rule to increase the sentence to 18 years. He reduced the credit to one quarter because the appellant had earlier opportunities over many years to admit the offending. The appellant appealed against the increased sentence. The central issue was whether those historic failures to admit guilt could justify reducing credit for pleas entered at the first reasonable opportunity on the charges before the court.

1. Appeal allowed. The sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment was quashed and replaced by a sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment.

2. The court held that the restrictive approach to the criminal slip-rule power stated in Nodjouni [1985] 1 Crim App R (s) 183 no longer constrained the exercise of that discretion. The Attorney General’s power under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer unduly lenient sentences changed the procedural context. The court noted the flexible approach described in Jama [2009] EWCA Crim 2109, which balances fairness to the defendant with the public interest in lawful and appropriate sentences.

3. The judge’s decision to reduce credit for the guilty pleas was nevertheless wrong. The applicable approach, reflected in the Sentencing Guidelines Council guideline and Caley [2013] 2 Crim App R (S) 47, entitled the appellant to the proper reduction for pleas entered at the first reasonable opportunity.

4. The appellant’s earlier denials could not be used to reduce that credit. He was being sentenced for the full catalogue of sexual offending, not merely for the earlier indecent assault. The seriousness of the offending, the appellant’s age and the other circumstances had already been reflected in the unchallenged 24-year starting point. If a higher sentence had been justified, it should have been achieved through a higher starting point rather than by reducing the guilty-plea discount.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): allowed the appeal and quashed the 18-year sentence, substituting 16 years’ imprisonment: [2016] EWCA Crim 541.

• Crown Court at Plymouth: on 25 June 2015 imposed 16 years’ imprisonment after guilty pleas. On 21 July 2015, applying the slip rule, increased the sentence to 18 years by reducing credit for the pleas.