Scullion, R. v

A sentencing court may dispense with a pre-sentence report when it has sufficient material to assess dangerousness and properly considers a report unnecessary under the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

The seriousness of a threat to kill depends particularly on its reality, the likelihood that it will be carried out, and the genuine fear caused. Relevant matters include the victim’s vulnerability, the manner and repetition of the threat, and the offender’s known violence or grievance. A calm and deliberate future threat may be especially grave where the victim knows of the offender’s violent history.

Anthony Scullion was convicted by a jury on 29 October 2015 of making a threat to kill a children’s social worker during care proceedings concerning his daughter. He received an extended sentence of six years, comprising a custodial term of four years.

He made a renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence. He contended that the judge should have raised dangerousness expressly and obtained a pre-sentence report, and that the custodial term was manifestly excessive.

The central issues were whether a report was necessary for the dangerousness assessment and whether the extended sentence or either of its elements was excessive.

1. Permission to appeal was refused. Although the judge ought expressly to have raised dangerousness during mitigation, the omission did not undermine the sentence. Given the nature of the threat, the applicant’s history of serious violence and intimidation, and the judge’s opportunity to observe him at trial, there was sufficient material to find a significant risk of serious harm.

2. Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 156, a pre-sentence report was unnecessary. The court accepted that dangerousness inevitably arose on the facts and held that the evidence available to the sentencing judge was more than sufficient for that assessment.

3. The four-year custodial term was not manifestly excessive. Attorney General’s Reference No 84 of 1999 identified, for guilty pleas, a range of two and a half to five years for threats to kill and identified relevant indicators of gravity. The most important were the reality of the threat, the threatened person’s belief that it might be carried out, and the genuine fear produced.

4. The threat was made calmly and deliberately, was directed to future killing, and was made against a vulnerable public-sector worker in children’s welfare. The victim knew of the applicant’s violent record and his grievance against her. The absence of a weapon or immediate violence did not reduce the seriousness; the planned and realistic character of the threat instead reinforced it.

5. There was therefore no basis to challenge the finding of dangerousness, the imposition of an extended sentence, or the length of either element.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence refused: [2016] EWCA Crim 684.
• Trial court: following jury conviction on 29 October 2015 for an offence contrary to section 16 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the applicant received an extended sentence of six years with a four-year custodial term. The court and citation are not stated in the judgment.