Lloyd v Jones & Ors

Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand the nature and effect of making a will, the extent of the property disposed of, and the claims of those who might ordinarily be considered. An insane delusion matters only if it affects the dispositions. Wandering or dementia does not automatically establish incapacity. Where a real doubt is raised, those propounding the will must prove capacity, knowledge and approval on the balance of probabilities. Knowledge and approval are assessed from the whole evidence. The court determines validity, not whether the testamentary distribution was appropriate.

The claimant challenged her mother’s 2005 will, which left a modest legacy to the claimant and the residue, including a farm, to the claimant’s brother and his wife. The will had been prepared by a relative who was a doctor, without professional assistance. The challenge alleged lack of testamentary capacity and want of knowledge and approval, relying principally on evidence of dementia, delusions, impaired eyesight and the circumstances of execution.

The defendants who propounded the will bore the burden of proving its validity. The central issues were whether the deceased had testamentary capacity when she signed the will and whether she knew and approved its contents.

1. Applicable principles. The test in Banks v Goodfellow requires the testator to understand the nature and effect of making a will, the extent of the property being disposed of, and the claims to which proper consideration ought to be given. An insane delusion is relevant only where it influences the testamentary disposition. Where a real doubt about capacity is raised, the party propounding the will must establish capacity on the balance of probabilities. The same burden applies to knowledge and approval, assessed from the evidence as a whole, applying Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430.
2. The deceased had begun to suffer from dementia by about May 2004. She probably experienced occasional delusions and night-time wandering, but those matters were substantially exaggerated in an attendance allowance application. The delusions did not affect the testamentary dispositions. Wandering, considered alone, did not establish that she lacked the understanding required by Banks v Goodfellow.
3. The independent evidence showed that the deceased remained capable of understanding the essential matters required for a testamentary disposition until at least mid-2006, and probably into 2007. She knew that she owned the farm, knew of her son and daughter and their claims, and was capable of reading the short, clear will.
4. The deceased knew that she was signing a will. The circumstances and the witnesses’ evidence supported the inference that she had read the document and understood its simple provisions. The terms were not irrational merely because they favoured the son and his wife over the claimant.
5. The court’s function was to decide whether the deceased had capacity and knew and approved the will, not to assess the fairness or appropriateness of the distribution. The will was valid and the claim was dismissed.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.