Gill v Woodall & Ors (Rev 1)

A will prepared by a solicitor, read over to a capable testator and duly executed carries a very strong presumption of knowledge and approval. Those circumstances are not conclusive. The court must assess the relevant evidence to determine whether those propounding the will have established that its contents represented the testator’s testamentary intentions. Testamentary capacity and actual understanding of the particular will are distinct questions. Surprising or unfair dispositions ordinarily provide insufficient grounds for challenging knowledge and approval, but may reinforce other evidence of deficient understanding. Appellate intervention in factual findings requires an unreasonable conclusion, findings unavailable on the evidence or another fundamental error. Exceptional psychiatric evidence may justify rejecting an inference of understanding despite apparently regular execution.

Joyce Gill and her husband owned a farm and made matching wills through a solicitor. Each left the estate to the surviving spouse, with the RSPCA as the ultimate beneficiary. Their only daughter, Dr Christine Gill, was expressly excluded. After her husband’s death, Mrs Gill became the sole owner of the farm. Following Mrs Gill’s death, probate was granted to Stephen Woodall and Stanley Lonsdale, partners in the solicitors’ firm and the appointed executors.

Dr Gill challenged the will for want of knowledge and approval and undue influence by her father. Alternatively, she claimed the farm through proprietary estoppel. The deputy High Court judge found knowledge and approval established, but revoked the grant of probate for undue influence. He also upheld the alternative estoppel claim.

The RSPCA appealed against the undue influence and estoppel conclusions. Dr Gill challenged the finding of knowledge and approval through her respondent’s notice. The central issue was whether Mrs Gill’s severe agoraphobia and panic disorder prevented her from understanding the will, despite its preparation and reading by a solicitor.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The order revoking the grant of probate stood because Mrs Gill lacked knowledge and approval of the will’s contents. This displaced the trial judge’s ground of undue influence. The court did not determine undue influence or the alternative proprietary estoppel claim.

2. Knowledge and approval required the testator to understand the particular document and accept it as expressing the testamentary intentions to which execution would give effect. This was distinct from testamentary capacity. A person could possess the capacity to make a will while failing to understand a particular will in the circumstances of its explanation and execution.

3. Preparation by a solicitor, reading over and due execution raised a very strong presumption of knowledge and approval. Courts should exercise considerable caution before rejecting a will executed in those circumstances. Nevertheless, those facts were not conclusive. The propounder’s burden had to be assessed against the whole evidence. Where extensive factual and expert evidence had been heard, a single assessment was generally preferable to separately asking whether suspicion had arisen and whether it had been dispelled. Either approach should produce the same answer. The approach in Crerar v Crerar, reproduced in In re Morris deceased [1971] P 62, was endorsed.

4. Surprising, unfair or perverse dispositions ordinarily fell well short of establishing deficient knowledge and approval. Testamentary freedom required respect for unexpected choices. Such dispositions could, however, support independent evidence casting doubt on understanding. Here, the decisive evidence concerned the severe effect of Mrs Gill’s psychiatric condition on her concentration and comprehension in a solicitor’s office.

5. The trial judge was entitled to find a prima facie case of deficient knowledge and approval. His three reasons for finding that case answered were unavailable on the evidence. Mrs Gill’s attendance at an earlier instructions meeting was unsupported and improbable. Her reading of the draft sent to the matrimonial home was speculative. The finding that the solicitor explained the will clause by clause contradicted his evidence that he read it through before inviting questions. The accepted expert evidence showed that Mrs Gill would not have understood a will read in that way.

6. Appellate intervention was justified by those evidential errors, rather than a different assessment of competing evidence. The decision depended on exceptional psychiatric evidence and provided no general encouragement to disappointed beneficiaries to challenge professionally prepared wills or careful first-instance findings. The order below was upheld on the ground advanced in the respondent’s notice.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2010] EWCA Civ 1430 , dismissed the RSPCA’s appeal unanimously and upheld revocation of the grant of probate for lack of knowledge and approval. Undue influence and proprietary estoppel were left undetermined.
• High Court, Chancery Division, Leeds District Registry: Mr James Allen QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, found knowledge and approval established but revoked the grant for undue influence. He also upheld Dr Gill’s alternative proprietary estoppel claim. He granted the RSPCA permission to appeal.