Gill v Woodall & Ors (Rev 1)

Whether a testator knew and approved a will’s contents is determined from the totality of the evidence. Proper execution of a will prepared by a solicitor and read to a capable testator is powerful evidence that it reflects testamentary intentions, but it is not conclusive.

Surprising or unfair dispositions alone will rarely justify setting aside a will. They may, however, support other evidence casting doubt on the testator’s actual understanding. Testamentary capacity is distinct from whether the testator understood and accepted the particular document when it was executed.

Mrs Gill’s will left her estate to her husband if he survived her by one month and, otherwise, to the RSPCA. It made no provision for her only daughter, Dr Gill. After Mrs Gill’s death, the High Court revoked the grant of probate. The judge held that Mrs Gill knew and approved the will, but that her husband had exercised undue influence. He also upheld Dr Gill’s proprietary-estoppel claim in the alternative.

The RSPCA appealed the findings of undue influence and proprietary estoppel. Dr Gill relied on a respondent’s notice and cross-appealed against the finding that her mother knew and approved the will. The central issue was whether Mrs Gill understood and accepted the particular will when she signed it on 27 April 1993.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The order revoking the grant of probate stood, but on the different ground that Mrs Gill did not know or approve the contents of the will. It was therefore unnecessary and inappropriate to decide the contingent undue-influence or proprietary-estoppel issues.
2. Knowledge and approval concerns whether the testator understood the document and its effect, and accepted it as expressing her testamentary intentions. It is distinct from testamentary capacity. A person may have capacity in general while failing, in the circumstances of execution, to understand the particular will.
3. The court held that the preferable inquiry is to assess all relevant evidence together. Due execution, a solicitor-prepared will, and its being read to the testator carry substantial weight, but do not conclusively establish knowledge and approval. A two-stage inquiry into suspicious circumstances and their removal may reach the same answer, but was unhelpful on these unusually complex facts.
4. Surprising terms, including exclusion of a close family member in favour of an apparently unconnected charity, could not alone invalidate the will. They could reinforce other evidence. Here, the decisive additional evidence was Mrs Gill’s severe agoraphobia and panic disorder, her likely inability to concentrate in the solicitor’s office, and the absence of evidential support for the trial judge’s three reasons for finding that she had understood the will.
5. The findings that Mrs Gill had attended an earlier instructions meeting, read the draft at home, and received a clause-by-clause explanation at execution were not open on the evidence. The Court of Appeal could therefore reverse the factual finding on knowledge and approval while emphasising the exceptional nature of the case.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The RSPCA’s appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the revocation of probate because Mrs Gill lacked knowledge and approval of the will’s contents: [2010] EWCA Civ 1430.
• High Court, Chancery Division, Leeds District Registry: Mr James Allen QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, revoked probate on undue influence, while finding that Mrs Gill knew and approved the will and that proprietary estoppel would alternatively have been established.