Alastair James Bowerman v Ian Benjamin Bowerman & Ors

Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand the nature and effect of making a will, the extent of the property disposed of, and the claims to which regard should be given, without an operative disorder or delusion. Where a duly executed will appears rational, capacity is presumed until a real doubt is raised; the propounder must then prove capacity.

Knowledge and approval are assessed holistically. Execution and reading are important but not conclusive, and the testator must understand the will’s broad effect. Testamentary undue influence requires coercion or fraud which overbears the testator’s free will. Long delay may bar a probate challenge where it is unjustified and has caused detrimental reliance or rendered related equitable relief academic.

Alastair Bowerman challenged the 1999 wills of his parents, John and Jean Bowerman. John’s will was challenged for lack of testamentary capacity and lack of knowledge and approval. Jean’s will was challenged for lack of knowledge and approval and undue influence.

The claim was brought in proceedings commenced in 2022, following substantial delay. Ben Bowerman defended the claim and counterclaimed for pronouncement in solemn form. The central issues were whether John had capacity and understood his will, whether Jean knew and approved her will, whether Ben procured it by undue influence, and whether delay and reliance barred the challenges.

1. John’s will. Applying the principles in Banks v Goodfellow ((1869-70) LR 5 QB 549), the court held that John lacked testamentary capacity when he executed his will on 22 April 1999. He was suffering an acute episode of heart failure and was severely unwell. The solicitors who attended him had not undertaken a structured capacity assessment. The burden therefore remained unsatisfied.
2. John also lacked knowledge and approval. He could not read and understand the explanatory letter or the will. The substantive changes had originated with the solicitor rather than with John’s own instructions. His later failure to redraw the will did not cure the defect.
3. The challenge to John’s will was independently barred by delay. Alastair knew of the will, had taken legal advice, and delayed for approximately 18½ years. His delay was inexplicable and was accompanied by an express disavowal of any intention to challenge. The executors had relied on that position in administering the estate. Further, any recovery claim against Jean’s estate would have been equitable and rendered academic by laches, applying Re McElroy ([2023] EWHC 109 (Ch)) and James v Scudamore ([2023] EWHC 996 (Ch)).
4. Jean’s will. Applying the holistic approach in Gill v Woodall ([2011] Ch 380), the court held that Jean knew and approved the contents. The will’s effect had been explained, she discussed its clauses with the solicitor, and she executed it at the solicitor’s office. The evidence did not establish that she misunderstood its broad effect.
5. The undue influence challenge failed. There is no presumption of undue influence in relation to testamentary dispositions. The claimant had to prove coercion or fraud which overbore Jean’s free will, applying Re Edwards ([2007] EWHC 1119 (Ch)). The diary evidence post-dated the will and did not show coercion at the relevant time. The circumstances of preparation and execution were also inconsistent with Ben having overborne Jean’s will.
6. The claims concerning both wills were dismissed, and the court pronounced for the 1999 wills in solemn form.

First-instance decision. The judgment does not state any appeal from an earlier decision.