Geleziunas v The Prosecutor General's Office, Republic of Lithuania

In an extradition appeal, passage of time must be assessed on the particular facts. The question is whether extradition, rather than the trial itself, would be unjust or oppressive. Culpable delay by requesting or executing authorities may deepen an established family life and make extradition oppressive. Article 8 requires a structured proportionality assessment balancing the exceptionally serious consequences of interference with family life against the weighty public interest in extradition. Under the Extradition Act 2003, the specified proportionality matters are the seriousness of the alleged conduct, the likely penalty, and the possibility of less coercive measures. Where substantial culpable delay, entrenched family responsibilities and an offence falling short of the utmost seriousness combine, extradition may be barred both by passage of time and by incompatibility with Article 8 and statutory disproportionality.

The appellant appealed under s 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Lithuania under an accusation European Arrest Warrant. He was wanted to face prosecution for alleged swindling involving scaffolding and related equipment. The District Judge rejected challenges based on passage of time and Article 8, but had not separately considered the statutory proportionality question under s 21A(1)(b).

Before the Administrative Court, the appellant relied on culpable delay by the Lithuanian authorities and the National Crime Agency, the establishment of family life in the United Kingdom, his role as principal carer for six children, and the likely consequences of extradition. The central questions were whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of delay, incompatible with Article 8, or disproportionate under s 21A.

1. Appeal allowed. The appellant’s extradition was barred under s 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, was incompatible with his and his family’s Article 8 rights, and was disproportionate under s 21A(1)(b).
2. Section 14 required consideration of whether extradition, rather than the proposed trial, would be unjust or oppressive. Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 provided the applicable distinction: injustice principally concerns prejudice to the trial, while oppression concerns hardship arising from changed circumstances, with overlap between the two. The assessment is fact-sensitive. There is no fixed period after which extradition becomes unjust or oppressive.
3. The appellant was not a fugitive and had lived openly in the United Kingdom. The requesting authorities had not explained the delay before issuing the domestic warrant and European Arrest Warrant. The National Crime Agency had initially carried out only PNC checks, although a basic Home Office check would have revealed his presence. There had therefore been at least about three years of culpable delay.
4. The delay had allowed the appellant’s family life to become more deeply established. He was in poor health, cared for six children while his wife worked, and the alleged offence, although serious and involving high-value property, was not of the utmost seriousness. A conviction would not necessarily result in an immediate custodial sentence. In those particular circumstances, extradition would be oppressive.
5. The Article 8 assessment required a structured balance between the interference with private and family life and the weighty public interest in extradition. Applying the guidance in Norris v Government of the United States of America (No.2) [2010] 2 AC 487, HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25 and Polish Judicial Authorities v Adam Celinski & others [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), the consequences for the family would be exceptionally severe. Extradition was consequently incompatible with Article 8 and disproportionate.
6. The further delay after the original hearing was included in the overall assessment. The court dealt administratively with consequential applications.

High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal under s 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 allowed against the District Judge’s order for extradition. The court held that extradition was oppressive by reason of passage of time, incompatible with Article 8, and disproportionate under s 21A.