Gardjas v District Court in Jelenia Gora, Poland

In an accusation European Arrest Warrant, the required place of an alleged offence may be inferred from the warrant read as a whole, provided the inference is clear. The court must exclude the requested person’s evidence and later further information when deciding whether the warrant itself supplies the necessary particulars.

For passage-of-time purposes, a person who knowingly leaves or remains outside the requesting state to avoid proceedings cannot ordinarily rely on the resulting delay. On an Article 8 appeal, the question is whether the extradition judge made the wrong decision. The high public interest in extradition may outweigh substantial delay and serious interference with established family life.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against an order for his extradition to Poland to face trial on 56 alleged offences. The District Judge rejected challenges based on the alleged failure to specify the location of seven offences, passage of time, Article 8 family and private life, and proportionality.

Before the Administrative Court, the appellant pursued the first three grounds. The central issues were whether the accusation warrant contained sufficient particulars under section 2, whether delay made extradition unjust or oppressive under section 14, and whether extradition was a proportionate interference with Article 8 rights.

1. Section 2 particulars. An accusation warrant must make clear the place where each offence is alleged to have occurred. The District Judge erred by taking account of the appellant’s evidence and the later “Further Information”. Those matters had to be ignored when assessing the warrant. Nevertheless, the warrant read as a whole clearly supported the inference that offences 46–52 occurred in Jelenia Gora. The continuity of the vehicle-fraud allegations, their timing, the common victim, and the reference to Jelenia Gora in the particulars of offence 54 were sufficient. The first ground therefore failed.
2. Passage of time. The District Judge was entitled, and right, to find that the appellant was a fugitive. The evidence showed that he knew of police interest and the proceedings, left Poland without giving contact details, and remained away. In the rare circumstances identified in Gomes v Trinidad & Tobago; Goodyear v Trinidad & Tobago [2009] UKHL 21, oppression may still require consideration despite flight. This was not such a case. The section 14 ground was therefore dispositive of the passage-of-time appeal.
3. Article 8 and appellate review. Applying Polish Judicial Authorities v Adam Celinski & others [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), the single question on appeal was whether the District Judge had made the wrong decision. Findings of fact, particularly after hearing evidence, ordinarily had to be respected. Applying the analysis in Re B (A Child) (FC) [2013] UKSC 33, the appellate court should focus on the decision itself; defects in reasoning did not necessarily establish that it was wrong.
4. Proportionality. The District Judge had weighed delay, the appellant’s settled family life, his partner and children, hardship, the public interest in extradition, and his fugitive status. The public interest in honouring extradition arrangements and discouraging the United Kingdom from becoming a safe haven for fugitives was very high. The number and seriousness of the alleged offences further favoured extradition. Even allowing for culpable delay and substantial hardship, the conclusion that extradition was proportionate was not wrong and was clearly right. The fresh evidence did not alter that conclusion. The appeal was dismissed.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Grant ordered extradition to Poland on 5 February 2015. The challenges under sections 2, 14 and 21A of the Extradition Act 2003 were rejected.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 was dismissed.