Riley & Ors v Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)

For the extended limitation period under section 31 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, the prosecutor is the body responsible for deciding whether to prosecute, not the investigating authority. The provision does not permit internal prosecutorial delay or administrative paper-shuffling to extend time.

An offence under section 4(2) is not one of strict liability. Liability requires at least knowledge of the circumstances relevant to the reasonable steps alleged to have been omitted. A partner is not criminally liable merely because a co-partner is alleged to have committed an animal-welfare offence. Magistrates may decline a pre-trial ruling on evidential sufficiency, but should use case-management powers to ensure that the prosecution identifies its core case in advance of trial.

The appellants were partners in a slaughterhouse business. They faced proceedings under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 arising from the alleged unnecessary suffering of a cow during attempts to move it.

Stephen Riley was alleged to have caused the suffering under section 4(1). Geoff, Michael and Kevin Riley were charged under section 4(2), although they were not present and were not alleged to have jointly committed Stephen Riley’s offence. The magistrates’ court rejected challenges concerning limitation, partnership liability, abuse of process, evidential sufficiency and admissibility. The appeal by case stated concerned whether those rulings were correct.

1. Limitation. The appeal concerning limitation was dismissed. Section 31(1)(b) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 refers to the prosecutor who decides whether the evidence is sufficient to justify proceedings. In this case that was the CPS, not the FSA or its official veterinarians. The FSA investigated and monitored compliance, but had no power to institute prosecutions. The statutory certificate was therefore effective and the proceedings were brought in time. The distinction between investigators and prosecutors did not authorise delay: once a suitably qualified CPS employee has the relevant knowledge, internal transfers or delay cannot extend the six-month period. The three-year long-stop also remains applicable.
2. Partnership liability. The appeals of Geoff, Michael and Kevin Riley were allowed. Section 4(2)(c) is not a strict-liability offence. The circumstances determine what steps were reasonable, so knowledge of those circumstances is an essential element and at least an element of culpability is required. Criminal liability is ordinarily personal. Partnership legislation concerning liability for civil wrongs and penalties does not impose criminal liability where it has not otherwise been established. The CPS could not avoid proving mens rea by prosecuting the partnership rather than individual partners.
3. Abuse of process. The challenge was hopeless. No separate proportionality test was required in the circumstances, consistent with James v DPP [2015] EWHC 3296 (Admin).
4. Pre-trial ruling and case management. The magistrates’ court was entitled under section 8A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to decline an evidential-sufficiency ruling before trial. However, it should have required the CPS promptly to clarify the factual basis of its allegation of unnecessary suffering. The CPS could not develop that core allegation for the first time at trial.
5. Admissibility. Evidence of the alleged push by Stephen Riley against the official veterinarian was admissible because it was relevant to whether he heard the instruction to stop and whether he took reasonable steps. Stephen Riley’s appeal was dismissed. The proceedings against the other three appellants were terminated.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal by way of case stated from preliminary rulings of District Judge Clarke at Blackburn magistrates’ court. Stephen Riley’s appeal was dismissed. The appeals of Geoff, Michael and Kevin Riley were allowed.