Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd v Crown Prosecution Service

Offences under Regulation 30(1)(g) of the Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing Regulations 2015 may be offences of strict liability. The court must first construe the underlying EU obligations and then decide whether the common-law presumption of mens rea has been displaced.

Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 imposes an absolute obligation on a slaughterhouse business operator to ensure compliance with the operational rules in Annex III. In the circumstances considered, failure systematically to sever the carotid arteries also constituted a breach of Article 3(1), because avoidable pain was deemed to have resulted.

Regulation 30(1)(g) distinguishes contravention from causing or permitting a contravention. Mens rea is not required for the former. Nor is proof of separate culpability required where liability is imposed directly on the business operator.

Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd operated a large poultry slaughterhouse. Three birds entered the scalding tank alive after their necks had not been properly cut.

The company was charged under Regulation 30(1)(g) of the Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing Regulations 2015 with contravening Article 3(1), and Article 15(1) read with point 3.2 of Annex III, of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009.

A district judge ruled that the offences did not require mens rea and that the prosecution need not prove a culpable act or omission by the company. The company sought to challenge those rulings by case stated and judicial review. The central issues were whether the court had jurisdiction under section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, whether the relevant obligations were strict, and whether Regulation 30(1)(g) required mens rea or separate culpability.

1. Procedure. The case stated procedure was unavailable because the district judge had made interlocutory rulings and the magistrates’ court proceedings remained extant. The appropriate route was judicial review. Permission was granted and the merits were determined within that procedure.
2. Article 15(1). Article 15(1) imposed on business operators a strict duty to ensure compliance with the operational rules in Annex III. Point 3.2 required the carotid arteries, or the vessels from which they arose, systematically to be severed after simple stunning. The duty was not limited to maintaining a system which ordinarily produced compliance. It required compliance on each occasion. The contrast with provisions imposing monitoring or procedural duties supported that construction.
3. Article 3(1). Article 3(1) imposed an overarching duty on business operators. On the facts, the Article 15(1) breach also breached Article 3(1), read with Article 3(2)(d), because the failure to sever the arteries meant that the birds were not spared avoidable pain. The strict nature of the Article 15 duty therefore made the Article 3 duty strict in this case.
4. Mens rea. Regulation 30(1)(g) was silent on mental fault. Applying the principles in Sweet v Parsley and Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v AG of Hong Kong, the presumption of mens rea could be displaced where the legislative purpose, statutory language and regulatory context clearly required strict liability. Animal welfare was a matter of public and social concern, and strict liability promoted greater vigilance by slaughterhouse operators.
5. The wording of Regulation 30(1)(g) supported a distinction between the limbs. Mens rea was required for causing or permitting a person to contravene, but not for the primary limb of contravening a specified provision. Importing mens rea into the latter limb would be inconsistent with the absolute language of Article 15(1).
6. Culpability and disposition. The company’s liability was properly characterised as direct or, in the alternative, vicarious in a statutory scheme imposing strict liability. No additional proof of knowledge or culpability was required. The two questions stated by the district judge were answered in the negative. The claim for judicial review was dismissed and the criminal proceedings were to continue before the district judge.

The judgment records no prior merits appeal. The district judge’s interlocutory rulings were challenged by case stated and judicial review. The Divisional Court held that the case stated route was inappropriate and determined the substantive issues on the judicial review claim.