Roden v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors

On a statutory challenge to a planning inspector’s decision, the court asks whether the decision is lawful, not whether it agrees with the planning merits. An inspector must address the principal important controversial issues, but need not rehearse every argument. Where tree loss is a principal issue, the inspector must consider it, including the quality and contribution of the trees concerned. A planning condition may lawfully control tree works where its wording covers those works and the inspector has assessed the relevant impacts. Consideration is not unlawfully deferred merely because future tree works remain subject to local planning authority control, provided the inspector has reached a rational conclusion on the likely impact and future pressure for works.

The claimant, a local resident, challenged under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288, an inspector’s decision allowing an appeal and granting permission for three dwellings at 1 Beaumont Road, Poole. The challenge concerned protected trees, including trees identified for removal, the quality of the trees, the arboricultural information, and the use of conditions to control construction and future tree works.

Permission to proceed was granted on grounds concerning tree loss, tree quality and alleged deferral of the impact assessment. Other grounds, including deficiencies in the arboricultural impact assessment and alleged misleading information, were not pursued or did not receive permission. The central questions were whether the inspector had addressed the principal tree-related issues and whether the imposed conditions lawfully enabled those matters to be controlled.

1. Outcome. The statutory challenge was dismissed. None of the permitted grounds was made out.
2. Principal issues. The loss of five trees, four of which were protected Monterey Pines on the Bessborough Road frontage, was a main issue in dispute. The inspector was therefore required to address it. Read as a whole, the decision letter did so. The inspector identified the proposed loss, accepted the assessment that the trees were of the lowest quality, considered their planning benefit in allowing new planting and breaking up the existing monoculture, and correctly construed Policy DM1.
3. Tree impacts and conditions. The inspector considered both trees proposed for removal and retained protected trees. He assessed root-protection-zone encroachment, the effects of demolition and construction, and the possibility of future pressure to prune or fell. His conclusion that significant pressure for works beyond normal arboricultural management was unlikely was a planning judgment open to him. Condition 9, read according to its terms, applied to tree works generally, including the works identified for removal. It required an approved arboricultural method statement before demolition or development, and all works to follow the approved details. Condition 6 also required approval of landscaping proposals, including retention and protection of existing trees.
4. Judicial review principles. The principles summarised in Bloor Homes East Midlands Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2014] EWHC 754 (Admin) applied. The court could not revisit the weight given to planning considerations or the merits of the inspector’s judgment. The decision letter was intelligible and adequately addressed the principal issues.
5. Alleged deferral and later matters. The inspector had not unlawfully deferred the assessment to future applications. He had made the necessary assessment and concluded that the likelihood of substantial future pressure was insufficient to undermine permission. The court would not determine the later alleged ring-barking of trees in this statutory challenge. A different 2011 decision was not before the inspector and concerned a different planning context.

This was a first-instance statutory challenge in the Administrative Court. Permission was refused on some grounds by Ouseley J on 12 May 2016; Gilbart J later granted permission on grounds 1–3 and refused permission on ground 4. The High Court dismissed the challenge.