Suresh v Samad & Ors (Rev 1)

In a defamation claim, a defence must identify the allegations admitted, denied or requiring proof and give coherent facts supporting any affirmative defence. A plea of truth must specify the defamatory meaning relied on and particularise the facts said to establish it. Allegations of fraud require the alleged conduct and dishonest state of mind to be identified with proper particularity. At summary judgment stage, the court may determine individual issues even where liability as a whole remains for trial. A defendant need only show a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. Unrepresented parties receive a fair opportunity to advance a tenable case, but repeated non-compliance does not dispense with the pleading rules.

The claimant brought libel proceedings concerning two videos published on YouTube and, in the case of the third defendant, Facebook. The videos alleged financial misconduct by the claimant, a trustee and chairman of a charity. The first three defendants, acting in person, advanced various denials and referred to truth, public interest and innocent dissemination.

The claimant sought strike-out and summary judgment. The defendants sought, among other things, permission to rely on late rejoinders and judgment on the basis that the claim concerned a charity. The court considered which issues were adequately pleaded and which had a real prospect of success.

1. Disposition. The claimant obtained summary judgment on publication, reference, defamatory meaning and serious harm arising from the YouTube publications. The defendants’ existing defences were struck out except for the issues of responsibility for YouTube publication and, for the third defendant, serious harm arising from Facebook publication. Those issues remained for trial. The summary judgment application on liability was adjourned to permit a final attempt to plead and evidence a defence of truth or public interest. The defendants’ applications for judgment based on the charity context and for permission to rely on the rejoinders were dismissed.
2. Under CPR 3.4(2)(a), a defence must disclose coherent facts which, even if true, would amount in law to a defence. Under CPR 16.5, failure to deal with an allegation may amount to an admission. The court should avoid undue reliance on mere technicalities, particularly where a party is unrepresented, but this does not cure a defence which fails to engage with the claim.
3. A plea of truth in defamation must identify the defamatory meaning or meanings relied on and give sufficient particulars of the facts said to establish truth. Fraud allegations require the claimant’s alleged conduct and dishonest state of mind to be identified. The defendants’ pleadings did not meet those requirements. Nevertheless, the evidence concerning the alleged cheque payment and estimated missing funds left a non-fanciful possibility that a properly formulated defence might be advanced, so a final opportunity was granted.
4. The public interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 required clear pleading of the relevant public-interest matter, reasonable belief and the supporting facts. The charity’s financial management was capable of being a matter of public interest, but general assertions were insufficient. Innocent dissemination could not realistically assist defendants who were alleged to have originated or editorially participated in the statements.
5. The charity character of the dispute did not prevent a personal defamation claim. The precise extent of publication and harm could be assessed at a remedies hearing if necessary.

The claim was issued on 18 September 2015. Default judgment against the third defendant was later set aside, after which he filed further defences. This judgment determined interlocutory applications in the High Court and left responsibility for YouTube publication, Facebook serious harm, possible truth or public-interest defences, and remedies for further consideration.