Williams, R (on the application of) v Police Appeals Tribunal & Ors

The limited weight ordinarily given to personal mitigation in professional disciplinary proceedings is not confined to dishonesty or lack of integrity. In police disciplinary proceedings, the central purpose of sanction is to maintain public confidence in and respect for the police service. The more seriously the misconduct threatens that confidence, the less weight personal mitigation can carry, although it must always be considered. Dismissal is not inevitable whenever gross misconduct is established. The outcome remains fact-specific, and must reflect the nature of the misconduct, its effect on public confidence, the officer’s responsibilities, and all relevant mitigation. On judicial review, the court must identify a public law error or a decision outside the range reasonably open to the Police Appeals Tribunal.

The claimant, a senior Metropolitan Police officer, admitted five incidents of misconduct, including inappropriate sexualised behaviour towards civilian and junior staff and personal use of part of a voucher donated for a police event. A misconduct panel found the conduct to be gross misconduct and dismissed him without notice. The Police Appeals Tribunal dismissed his appeal, holding that the panel’s decision was not unreasonable.

On judicial review, the claimant argued that the panel and Tribunal had misapplied Bolton v Law Society and Salter v Chief Constable of Dorset, failed to give proper weight to his mitigation, and imposed a disproportionate sanction. The central issue was whether the restriction on the weight of personal mitigation applied beyond dishonesty or lack of integrity.

1. Claim dismissed. The court found no error of law or other public law error in the Police Appeals Tribunal’s decision.

2. The principle derived from Bolton v Law Society and Salter v Chief Constable of Dorset was not limited to misconduct involving dishonesty or lack of integrity. Sanctions in professional disciplinary proceedings are primarily directed to protecting the public and maintaining confidence in the profession, rather than punishing the individual. Those considerations apply equally to other forms of gross police misconduct which may seriously damage public confidence.

3. Personal mitigation must always be taken into account, but it cannot carry the same weight as it might in criminal sentencing where the principal purpose is punishment. The relevant weight depends on the extent to which the misconduct threatens public confidence and respect. Dishonesty will ordinarily require dismissal, subject to exceptional circumstances; other breaches of the professional standards require a fact-specific assessment.

4. The panel was entitled to regard the claimant’s senior rank as aggravating, because it carried heightened responsibilities and required him to set an example. It was also entitled to conclude that the medical evidence did not establish that the misconduct resulted from his medical condition, and that the severe pension consequences could not justify imposing a lesser sanction if dismissal was otherwise necessary.

5. The panel had considered the claimant’s long and exemplary service, character evidence, medical evidence, admissions, remorse and financial loss. Its reasons could have been fuller, but they were sufficient to show that the relevant matters had been balanced against the need to maintain public confidence. The Police Appeals Tribunal was entitled to conclude that dismissal was not unreasonable and was within the range of sanctions reasonably open to the panel.

6. The costs order required the claimant to pay the Police Appeals Tribunal’s costs and the costs of the Interested Party’s acknowledgment of service. Any claim against HMCTS would require compliance with CPR 46.2.

The claim was a first-instance application for judicial review of the Police Appeals Tribunal’s decision dated 15 February 2016. The Tribunal had dismissed the claimant’s appeal against the misconduct panel’s decision to dismiss him without notice.