Deman v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Anor

Leave to bring a defamation claim outside the primary limitation period is exceptional. The court must decide whether it is equitable to permit the claim, having regard to prejudice to both sides and the public interest in prompt resolution of defamation disputes. The single publication rule prevents later website accesses from creating fresh causes of action. A stale claim may also fail for lack of serious harm, abuse of process, or lack of a real and substantial tort. A fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings attracts qualified privilege despite peripheral inaccuracies. Malice must be supported by pleaded facts indicating bad faith; bare assertions are insufficient.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning an online newspaper article published in 2011. The article referred to findings made in earlier Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings and alleged that the claimant was a serial race claimant obsessed with being racially discriminated against.

The defendants applied to strike out the claim under CPR 3.4 and for summary judgment under CPR 24(2). The issues included limitation, leave under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980, serious harm, abuse of process, qualified privilege, and malice.

1. Limitation. The first relevant access to the article after commencement of the single publication regime was on 1 January 2014. Under section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013, that was the first publication for limitation purposes. The primary period therefore expired on 31 December 2014. Later accesses did not create new causes of action.
2. Leave under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 was refused. The discretion is exceptional in defamation cases. The claimant gave no satisfactory explanation for the delay, while the defendants faced substantial forensic prejudice, including loss of evidence and difficulty in defending an attempt to reopen old findings.
3. Alternative grounds. The claim disclosed no serious harm requiring redress and had no real prospect of success. It was also an impermissible collateral attack on the earlier EAT decision and an abuse of process. The earlier settled proceedings against the first defendant did not, standing alone, justify strike-out on abuse grounds.
4. Qualified privilege. The article was, in its material respects, a fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings. Peripheral inaccuracies did not undermine that character. The broad approach traditionally taken to fairness and accuracy in reports intended for lay readers applied.
5. Malice. Allegations of malice require properly pleaded facts showing bad faith. Bare assertions were insufficient and liable to be struck out. Qualified privilege was therefore available to both defendants.
6. The applications were granted. The claim was struck out under CPR 3.4 and summary judgment was entered under CPR Part 24.