Jelson Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

When determining housing need for a planning appeal, an inspector must identify a workable Full Objectively Assessed Need (FOAN) using the best available evidence, even where the evidence is imperfect. FOAN is a policy-off figure, closely related to demographic projections but capable of adjustment for objectively evidenced housing need. The housing requirement is a later policy-on figure, reflecting policy constraints and delivery considerations. An inspector may adopt a range or approximate figure sufficient to resolve the appeal and need not produce an authoritative assessment binding in later cases. Planning judgment attracts a substantial margin of discretion. An inspector’s reasons need address the principal controversial issues but need not analyse every item of evidence. A planning obligation under regulation 122(2) of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 requires a direct and evidenced connection between the development and the expenditure.

The claimant applied for permission for residential development and associated infrastructure at Burbage, Leicestershire. The local planning authority refused permission, and the claimant’s appeal to an inspector was dismissed on 4 May 2016. The inspector found that the authority had a five-year housing land supply, using a FOAN range of 375 to 450 dwellings per annum derived principally from the Leicester and Leicestershire Strategic Housing Market Assessment.

The claimant challenged the decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Ground I concerned the inspector’s calculation of FOAN and her treatment of affordable housing, demographic projections and a proposed figure of 980 dwellings per annum. Ground II concerned the reasoning for a proposed planning obligation funding additional police services and compliance with regulation 122(2) of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010.

1. Ground I dismissed. The distinction between FOAN and housing requirement was material. FOAN is a policy-off assessment, closely linked to household projections but not necessarily identical to them. The housing requirement is policy-on because it incorporates policy considerations and constraints. The inspector was therefore required to determine a workable FOAN for the appeal, but not an authoritative figure binding the authority in other proceedings.
2. The inspector was entitled to work from demographic projections, test them against affordable housing and economic evidence, consider updated population projections, and use the Core Strategy figure as a benchmark without treating it as the FOAN. Where evidence is imperfect, an inspector may make the best judgment reasonably available, including by adopting a range or approximate figure. Only in an exceptional case, where the evidence makes assessment impossible, must the inspector explain that conclusion.
3. The inspector had not confused policy-off need with policy-on delivery by referring to whether affordable housing need should be met. Read fairly and as a whole, the decision treated affordable housing as relevant to the assessment of total housing need. The rejection of the 980 dwellings-per-annum figure was rational: it was derived from a policy-based relationship between affordable housing and total housing, rather than from the demographic methodology relevant to FOAN. The comparable figure in Oadby & Wigston Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was likewise treated as unrealistic and irrelevant to FOAN.
4. Ground II dismissed. The inspector’s reasons for accepting the police contribution were brief but adequate. The evidence established a direct causal connection between the proposed development and additional policing demands, and supported expenditure on specified equipment and services. The requirements of regulation 122(2) were therefore addressed sufficiently.
5. The statutory application failed and the planning appeal remained dismissed.

The judgment was a first-instance statutory application under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 challenging an inspector’s decision dated 4 May 2016. The application was dismissed.