Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust

A claimant convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility cannot reopen the criminal court’s findings about the mental prerequisites of criminal responsibility in subsequent negligence proceedings. The illegality principle, as applied in Clunis v Camden and Islington HA and Gray v Thames Trains Ltd, may bar claims arising from the claimant’s criminal act, including losses connected with detention and losses consequential upon the offence. A first-instance court remains bound by those authorities unless a later higher decision expressly or necessarily displaces them. A general, flexible approach to illegality in Patel v Mirza did not make the earlier authorities inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court authority.

The defendant admitted breach of duty and causation in a clinical negligence claim brought by a claimant who, while suffering from severe paranoid schizophrenia, killed her mother and was convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility.

The claimant sought damages for psychiatric injury, loss of liberty following hospital and restriction orders, loss of amenity, loss arising from the Forfeiture Act 1982, and future treatment and care costs. The court tried as a preliminary issue whether some or all of those claims were barred by illegality or public policy.

The central questions were the effect of the sentencing judge’s remarks, the scope of Clunis v Camden and Islington HA and Gray v Thames Trains Ltd, and whether later Supreme Court authority, particularly Patel v Mirza, permitted the first-instance court to reach a different result.

1. Preliminary issue. Judgment was entered for the defendant. All six heads of claim were irrecoverable on public policy grounds. The claim was dismissed.
2. The claimant’s conviction for manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility was conclusive evidence that she possessed the mental prerequisites of criminal responsibility. The civil court could not reopen the basis of that conviction or treat her as having no personal responsibility for the killing.
3. The sentencing remarks, read as a whole, placed the claimant towards the lower end of the spectrum of personal responsibility. That conclusion did not alter the binding effect of the conviction or the applicable authorities.
4. In Gray v Thames Trains Ltd, the House of Lords recognised narrow and wide forms of the public policy rule. The narrow rule precluded recovery for loss of liberty or other loss arising from a lawful criminal disposal imposed because of the claimant’s unlawful act. The wider rule barred recovery for loss suffered in consequence of the claimant’s criminal act. The majority had not limited the decision to offenders bearing significant personal responsibility.
5. The second reservation expressed by Lord Phillips in Gray did not represent a limitation adopted by the majority. On the alternative assumption that it did, any observations about cases involving less than significant responsibility were obiter, while the ratio was confined to cases involving significant responsibility.
6. The court was bound by Clunis, which had been expressly endorsed in Gray. The subsequent decision in Patel had not expressly criticised or overruled either authority. A first-instance judge could not infer that Clunis could not stand with general statements in a later Supreme Court judgment.
7. A certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 and permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal were refused. Costs were awarded to the defendant, not to be enforced without leave.

First-instance preliminary-issue decision. The judgment records earlier procedural orders, including admission of liability and refusal of permission to amend the claim to include a Human Rights Act claim. The court entered judgment for the defendant and refused permission to appeal and a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969.