Muller Property Group v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government

National planning policy must be interpreted objectively, but its application involves planning judgment. A decision-maker may give a policy no weight, or depart from it, provided the decision is rational and reasons are given. Where housing-supply policies are out of date, the decision-maker must apply the paragraph 14 presumption in the National Planning Policy Framework. The relevant question is whether the adverse impacts would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits when assessed against the Framework as a whole. A development need not satisfy the economic, social and environmental dimensions jointly and simultaneously in order to be sustainable development.

The claimant sought permission to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision dismissing two planning appeals concerning residential and employment development at Stapeley, Cheshire. An earlier decision had been quashed by consent after the Secretary of State failed to apply his prematurity policy and misstated the amount of best and most versatile agricultural land. On reconsideration, the Secretary of State dismissed the appeals, treating countryside policies as carrying reduced but significant weight and finding conflict with policy concerning agricultural land. The claimant challenged the reasoning on sustainable development, the planning balance, agricultural land and consistency of decision-making. The immediate issue was whether the proposed grounds were arguable.

1. Permission. Leave to apply under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was granted on grounds concerning the misapplication of paragraph 14 of the National Planning Policy Framework, the treatment of best and most versatile agricultural land, and an amended ground concerning inconsistency, reasons and prematurity. Permission was refused on the pleaded irrationality and inadequate-reasons ground, and on the original form of ground (a).
2. Interpretation and application of policy. The court must determine the meaning of planning policy objectively. Applying policy to the facts remains a matter for the planning decision-maker and is reviewable only on conventional public-law grounds. A decision-maker may decline to apply a policy, or give it no weight, if that course is rational and explained. There is no need to introduce a separate concept of residual discretion.
3. Paragraph 14 of the NPPF. Once the Secretary of State concluded that the relevant housing policies were out of date, he had to ask whether the adverse impacts of granting permission would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, assessed against the NPPF as a whole. The NPPF’s statement that economic, social and environmental gains should be sought jointly and simultaneously is general guidance, not a requirement that every development satisfy all three dimensions before it can be sustainable development. The decision letter’s additional test of whether the development was sustainable overall was therefore arguably inconsistent with the Secretary of State’s own policy.
4. Agricultural land. It was arguable that the Secretary of State had departed without adequate rational basis from the Inspector’s finding, supported by undisputed expert evidence, that the housing need could only be met by using land containing at least as much best and most versatile agricultural land as the appeal site. Evidence concerning comparable decisions was relevant as evidence bearing on availability, even though those decisions were not determinative.
5. Final procedural order. The amended ground was allowed to proceed on the basis of its supporting justification, including the alleged prematurity approach and failure to follow the relevant policy. The judgment determined arguability at the permission stage and did not finally quash the decision letter.

The judgment itself records an earlier challenge to the Secretary of State’s March 2015 decision. The Secretary of State submitted to judgment and a consent order was made on 3 July 2015 before Hickinbottom J. The present matter was a renewed oral application after Kerr J refused permission on the papers on 8 November 2016.