Barron & Ors v Collins

An accepted offer of amends under sections 2 to 4 of the Defamation Act 1996 may be set aside only in special circumstances. The court has a discretion to permit resiling from the statutory scheme, but such relief will be rare where the offer was freely and properly advised. Relevant considerations include whether circumstances have materially changed, whether the change was foreseeable, prejudice to the other party, and the importance of settled expectations. Failure to agree the details of performance does not undo the agreement, since the statutory scheme provides mechanisms for resolving implementation disputes. A proposed reopening of the case must be supported by a coherent explanation of the proposed defence. Mere bundles of documents and general assertions are insufficient. Public interest in political speech does not, without more, justify reopening liability.

The claimants brought libel and slander proceedings concerning statements made by the defendant at a political party conference. The defendant’s solicitors subsequently made an offer of amends under the Defamation Act 1996. The claimants accepted the offer, but the parties did not agree compensation, correction, apology or publication arrangements.

The defendant later sought to vacate the offer and defend the claims on grounds including lack of informed consent, rejection of the offer, possible defences under the Defamation Act 2013, freedom of expression and parliamentary immunity. The central issue was whether there were sufficient special circumstances to permit her to resile from the accepted offer.

1. The application to vacate the accepted offer of amends was dismissed. The defendant had personally authorised the offer after receiving clear oral and written advice. The claimants had accepted the offer itself, although they had rejected a separate offer of a specified sum in damages. The absence of agreement on implementation did not invalidate the agreement. The statutory scheme supplied mechanisms for resolving disputes about fulfilment.

2. The governing approach was that identified by the Court of Appeal in Warren v The Random House Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 834. The court could permit resiling from an accepted offer in appropriate circumstances, but the discretion should rarely be exercised. The question was whether special circumstances made it just to deprive the claimants of the benefit of their bargain. Relevant considerations included the context, whether circumstances had materially changed, whether later events were foreseeable, and the prejudice caused by disturbing settled expectations.

3. The defendant had not shown any material change since the offer was made. The proposed arguments on serious harm, truth and public interest could have been investigated earlier. The allegations of negligent legal advice and failure to consider possible defences were unsupported by the contemporary evidence. The court also treated delay, disruption and the risk of irrecoverable costs as prejudice.

4. The court accepted that a rare case might exist in which the public interest required reopening an accepted offer even without a material change of circumstances. This was not such a case. A defendant seeking to reopen liability must provide a coherent account of the proposed defence, including the facts relied on and how they would be proved. Files of documents accompanied by general assertions were inadequate.

5. The proposed public-interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 required proof both of belief that publication was in the public interest and of circumstances making that belief reasonable. The defendant had provided no adequate pleading or evidence addressing those requirements. Freedom of political speech added no separate basis for reopening the case.

6. The defendant’s parliamentary-immunity argument failed because the conference speech had no direct and obvious connection with her duties as a Member of the European Parliament. The next step was the hearing of the claimants’ assessment application.

The judgment records earlier High Court procedural and interlocutory decisions in the same proceedings, including the determination of meaning and a stay relating to parliamentary immunity. It is a first-instance decision on the application to vacate the accepted offer of amends.