Sanderson v City of Bradford Metropolitan Borough Council

Under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, the court must decide whether it is fair and just, having regard to all the circumstances, to allow a personal-injury claim to proceed despite expiry of the limitation period. Relevant considerations include the length and subjective reasons for post-limitation delay, the cogency of the evidence, the parties’ conduct, promptness after knowledge of a possible claim, expert advice, the overall passage of time and the apparent strength of the claim. A short delay will not necessarily cause material prejudice where the defendant retains a fair opportunity to investigate and defend the claim.

The claimant, as widow and personal representative of the deceased, sought damages from Bradford MDC for alleged occupational exposure to asbestos during the deceased’s employment as a council plumber. The claim was issued about ten weeks after primary limitation expired. The deceased died after issue, and the claimant continued the proceedings under the Fatal Accidents Act. The court tried limitation as a preliminary issue and considered whether section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 should be used to permit the claim to proceed. The central question was whether, in all the circumstances, it was equitable to disapply the limitation provisions.

1. Application granted. It was fair and just for Bradford MDC to meet the claim on its merits notwithstanding the delay. The court directed that the claim proceed under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.
2. The deceased acquired knowledge for section 14 purposes on diagnosis of mesothelioma on 19 July 2010, so primary limitation expired on 19 July 2013. The relevant delay under section 33(3)(a) was the period from expiry to issue, about ten weeks. The court considered that delay subjectively and accepted the shock of the diagnosis, debilitating treatment, unexpected remission, desire to preserve family normality and concern about legal costs as good reasons.
3. The section 33(3) factors are the primary matters in the balancing exercise, but the discretion remains unfettered and requires consideration of all the circumstances. The fundamental question is whether it is fair and just to expect the defendant to defend the claim on its merits despite the delay.
4. The short post-limitation delay had not materially reduced the cogency of the evidence or compromised the defendant’s fair opportunity to defend. The deceased’s evidence was materially corroborated by the depot manager, and the defendant had not challenged important witness or expert evidence. The defendant’s three-month delay in notifying insurers also weighed against its contention that the claim should be barred.
5. The court did not determine the substantive asbestos claim. It considered the evidence sufficiently compelling to show a strong case and good prospects, including evidence of frequent exposure and the reasonable practicability of reducing it. The overall passage of time, including the period since exposure and diagnosis, was relevant, but did not outweigh the factors favouring an extension.

First-instance determination of a preliminary limitation issue. No prior or subsequent appellate decision is stated in the judgment.