Lear v Hickstead Ltd & Anor

Activities carried out on premises by third parties may fall within the occupier’s liability under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, including where a temporary obstruction creates the danger. At common law, the relevant question is whether personal injury to visitors was reasonably foreseeable if horseboxes were parked so that ramps might need to be raised or lowered. The precise mechanism, victim, sequence of events and severity of injury need not be foreseen. A real risk is sufficient; probability is not required at the duty stage. Liability nevertheless depends on breach. Reasonable care does not require an occupier or parking contractor to prevent every obstruction or supervise every vehicle movement. A reasonable system designed to avoid and address obstructions may discharge the duty.

The claimant suffered serious spinal injuries when the ramp of his horsebox fell on him after it had apparently been raised manually by persons unknown. He claimed that Hickstead, the occupier and event organiser, was liable under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 and at common law, and that WH, the specialist parking contractor, was liable at common law.

Liability was ordered to be tried as a preliminary issue. The central questions were whether either defendant owed a relevant duty of care, whether the alleged obstruction and parking arrangements amounted to breach, and whether the defendants could rely on causation, volenti, contributory negligence or independent-contractor arguments.

1. The claim was dismissed. The claimant failed to establish breach of duty against either defendant.

2. The claimant was potentially owed the statutory common duty of care. The relevant danger could arise from horsebox movements or the lifting of a ramp by third parties on the premises. The fact that an obstruction might be temporary did not prevent the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 from applying.

3. At common law, it was sufficient that personal injury to visitors was a real and reasonably foreseeable risk if horseboxes were parked so that ramps had to be raised or lowered. The court rejected the need to foresee the precise eleven-step sequence suggested by the defendants, the identity of the injured person, or the exact mechanism and severity of injury. The intervention of a third party did not require a higher degree of foreseeability on these facts.

4. The evidence did not establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the claimant’s horsebox caused an obstruction or that this caused the ramp to be raised. The more probable explanation was that another driver wished to leave more quickly by reversing.

5. In any event, the defendants operated a reasonable parking system. It provided for organised rows, adequate space for forward movement, individual direction to parking spaces, displayed telephone numbers and experienced parking personnel. Reasonable care did not require absolute prevention of every obstruction, continuous supervision of every vehicle movement, or impractical additional precautions.

6. Hickstead could also rely on WH’s specialist expertise. Its appointment, instructions and periodic monitoring were reasonable. The independent-contractor defence under section 2(4)(b) was therefore available. The alternative defences of remoteness, novus actus interveniens, volenti and contributory negligence would also have failed.