Catesby Estates Ltd & Anor v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

In a challenge to a planning appeal decision, the court must read an inspector’s decision letter fairly and as a whole. The inspector need address the principal important controversial issues, and need not rehearse every argument or material consideration. The weight given to planning considerations and technical evidence is ordinarily a matter for the decision maker, provided the judgment is rational. Planning policy is interpreted objectively as a matter of law, but its application is for the decision maker. Procedural fairness requires knowledge of the main opposing points and a reasonable opportunity to answer them, together with material prejudice. An error of fact warrants quashing only where the fact was established and objectively verifiable, the claimant was not responsible, and the mistake materially affected the reasoning.

The claimants, property developers, challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 a planning appeal decision refusing outline permission for up to 490 houses at Whitford Road, Bromsgrove. Permission had been refused on highways grounds. The inspector concluded that the proposed diversion and other mitigation measures would not adequately address severe effects on congestion, movement and highway safety, and that the adverse impacts outweighed the housing and economic benefits.

The claimants alleged misunderstanding of the emerging development plan and Infrastructure Delivery Plan, errors concerning unmitigated traffic impacts and the proposed mitigation, irrationality, errors of fact and procedural unfairness.

1. The claim was dismissed. The decision letter was to be read fairly and as a whole, without excessive legalistic textual criticism. The inspector was required to address the principal important controversial issues, not every argument or material consideration.
2. The inspector was entitled to conclude that the proposed Whitford Road diversion and lack of signalisation at Fox Lane did not sit comfortably with the Infrastructure Delivery Plan and emerging development plan. The Infrastructure Delivery Plan was evidence supporting the emerging plan, rather than an immutable policy document. The inspector’s concern was the absence of a strategic and cumulative assessment of the diversion’s effect on other strategic sites, particularly Perryfields. He properly took account of the highway authority’s support, but was entitled to conclude that the evidence had not established a tested alternative strategy.
3. The conclusion that the unmitigated development would have severe cumulative effects was rationally open to the inspector on the evidence, including the claimants’ traffic assessments, survey evidence, expert evidence and site visits. The limitations of the Picady modelling did not require the evidence to be disregarded.
4. The inspector was entitled to find the mitigation strategy unconvincing. The section 106 undertaking did not secure that the contribution would fund the essential Hanover Street junction works. The uncertainty over further funding and the possibility that the contribution could be spent on other junctions justified the conclusion that the undertaking fell short of the mitigation required. The inspector also gave rational reasons for treating the Moskowitz diversion methodology with considerable caution, including its lack of iterative capacity and its inability to model the saturated urban alternative route.
5. The inspector applied the correct reasonable-prospect test to the proposed planning condition. His observations about the Traffic Regulation Order concerned the practical deliverability and efficacy of the mitigation, rather than a misunderstanding of the legal requirements. It was open to him to conclude that the traffic impacts had not been shown to be effectively mitigated.
6. There was no procedural unfairness. Highway safety, congestion, the wider effects of the diversion and the need for holistic assessment were issues which were either raised in the evidence and submissions or were reasonably foreseeable in the context of the planning policy and the case being advanced. The claimants had a reasonable opportunity to address them and had not shown material prejudice.

The claim was a first-instance challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to a planning appeal decision. No further appellate history was stated in the judgment.