Department for Work and Pensions v Brindley

A contractual release in a COT3 of claims “arising from the facts of the Proceedings” extends to claims arising from the specific factual matrix of the settled proceedings. It does not, without clearer language, release all later or separate employment claims merely because they concern the employer’s continuing use of the same policy. The date limit in the release identifies the period within which claims arising from that factual matrix may be caught; it does not enlarge the factual matrix itself.

Previous negotiations and declarations of subjective intention are inadmissible when construing the COT3.

The employee’s first disability-discrimination claim concerned the loss of a disabled parking space, consequential absence, and a final written warning issued in April 2014. It was settled by a COT3 in December 2014.

Her later claim challenged a different final written warning, issued in November 2014 in relation to other absences. The employer contended that the COT3 barred that claim because it released relevant claims arising from the facts of the earlier proceedings up to the date of the agreement.

The Employment Tribunal held that the later claim arose from new circumstances and retained jurisdiction. The employer appealed. The central issue was the proper construction of the release in the COT3.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Tribunal correctly held that the COT3 did not bar the later disability-discrimination claim.

2. The governing wording released the original proceedings and other relevant claims “arising from the facts of the Proceedings” up to the agreement date. Properly construed, that expression referred to the specific factual matrix of the first proceedings, rather than to a broad background of any application of the employer’s attendance-management policy to the employee.

3. The first claim concerned the April 2014 warning and the factual circumstances said to have caused the relevant absence, including the parking-space issue. The second claim concerned a separate warning, issued in November 2014, for different periods of absence. It therefore did not arise from the facts of the first proceedings.

4. The words “up to and including the date this Agreement” did not widen the release to every employment claim occurring before that date. They would catch a claim arising from the same factual matrix within that period. Thus, for example, a reinstatement before the agreement date of the April warning could have been caught.

5. Emails from the settlement negotiations were inadmissible for construing the COT3. The Employment Judge’s observation about ACAS practice, even if erroneous, was wholly immaterial. The Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the second claim.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the employer’s appeal in [2016] UKEAT 0123_16_1711.
• Employment Tribunal, Ashford: in a decision announced on 22 December 2015, held that it had jurisdiction to consider the employee’s later claim because it was not barred by the COT3.