In the matter of the Baronetcy of Pringle of Stichill

A title of honour descends by ius sanguinis under the original grant. Delay, enrolment, parental acknowledgement and long-established expectations do not themselves extinguish the rightful heir’s claim. The evidential presumption of paternity may be rebutted on the balance of probabilities by reliable DNA evidence. A plea of mora, taciturnity and acquiescence is personal to the claimant and requires unfairness on the particular facts. DNA obtained for connected genealogical purposes was not obtained by deception. Even assuming a breach of the Data Protection Act 1998, exclusion was disproportionate where the evidence was central and highly probative.

This was a reference to the Board under section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833 concerning the baronetcy of Pringle of Stichill. Simon Robert Pringle claimed through his grandfather, Norman Hamilton Pringle, who had been enrolled as the ninth baronet. His cousin, Norman Murray Archibald MacGregor Pringle, claimed that DNA evidence showed that Norman Hamilton was not the son of the eighth baronet and that Murray was therefore the heir male under the original grant.

An earlier application in the Family Division for a declaration of parentage had been dismissed by consent. Simon opposed admission of the DNA evidence on grounds including prescription, delay, confidentiality, privacy and data protection. The Board had to decide whether the evidence was admissible and, if so, who was entitled to the baronetcy.

Lord Hodge delivered the judgment of the Board, which answered the reference unanimously.

1. Entitlement. Under Scots law, a title of honour vests by ius sanguinis in the heir specified by the original grant. The relevant question was who was the male heir of the first baronet when the succession opened, not whether the claimant was the heir male of the immediately preceding holder. This approach was confirmed in Dunbar of Kilconzie v Lord Advocate 1986 SC (HL) 1. A later-discovered or reappearing heir could displace the person previously identified.
2. Presumption and prescription. There was an evidential presumption that Norman Hamilton was the legitimate son of the eighth baronet, but it was rebuttable. The presumption under the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986 could be rebutted on the balance of probabilities. The DNA evidence was sufficiently cogent to do so. The right to succeed to a title of honour did not prescribe under the pre-1973 law or the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. Schedule 3 paragraph (h), concerning the imprescriptible right to be served as heir, protected the logically consequential ius sanguinis. Section 8 did not alter that conclusion.
3. Personal bar. Mora, taciturnity and acquiescence required all three elements, together with unfairness specific to the facts. The plea was personal to Murray, so his father’s inaction was irrelevant. Murray had not known of the alleged non-paternity until receiving the DNA results. The plea operated as a shield, not a sword, and could not establish Simon’s entitlement.
4. Confidentiality and data protection. Sir Steuart had consented to DNA testing for genealogical purposes closely connected with the baronetcy and had not been shown to have been deceived. There was therefore no breach of confidence or misuse of private information. Even if Murray had breached the Data Protection Act 1998, Scots law permitted a fairness-based discretion over improperly obtained evidence. The evidence’s nature, purpose, manner of obtaining it, lack of deception and central probative value made exclusion disproportionate.
5. Disposition. The DNA evidence was admitted. It demonstrated to a high degree of probability that Norman Hamilton was not the son of the eighth baronet. Murray was the heir male of the first baronet and entitled to succeed to the baronetcy.

• Privy Council—Reference under section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833; the Board advised that the DNA evidence was admissible and that Murray was entitled to the baronetcy.
• Family Division of the High Court—An application under section 55A of the Family Law Act 1986 was dismissed by consent on 23 April 2013.