Pye v Queen Mary University of London

Case management decisions, including striking out a claim, are discretionary. On appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the relevant question is whether the Employment Tribunal erred in law, relied on irrelevant considerations, or acted outside the broad discretion entrusted to it.

Where a litigant’s ill health creates continuing uncertainty about whether a lengthy hearing can fairly proceed, the tribunal must balance the claimant’s right to a fair hearing against the respondent’s corresponding right to a fair hearing with reasonable expedition. Fairness extends to respondents and witnesses facing serious allegations, and may justify striking out the claim as a whole rather than preserving apparently separable issues.

Dr Robert Pye brought extensive Employment Tribunal claims against Queen Mary University of London, including detriment for protected disclosures, discrimination and harassment, victimisation, unfair redundancy dismissal, and unpaid notice, pension and holiday pay.

The Tribunal initially struck out the claim in February 2011, but the Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed an appeal and remitted the matter. After further postponements and medical evidence stating that Dr Pye remained unfit to conduct his case, the Tribunal struck out the claim under rules 47 and 37(1)(e) on 3 February 2014. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed his appeal: UKEAT/0151/15/MC. The central issue was whether the Tribunal’s refusal to adjourn again, and its consequential strike-out decision, was legally or discretionally flawed.

1. Permission refused. The Employment Tribunal’s substantive strike-out decision, its refusal to review that decision, the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s refusal to review its decision, and the £100 costs order disclosed no arguable basis for challenge.
2. An appellate court reviewing an Employment Appeal Tribunal decision is essentially scrutinising the Employment Tribunal’s first-instance decision. A case-management decision, even one invoking the drastic remedy of strike-out, is discretionary. It can be challenged only if the tribunal erred in law, took irrelevant matters into account, or acted outside the wide discretion conferred on it.
3. The Employment Tribunal was entitled to find that the medical evidence gave no certainty that Dr Pye would become fit to conduct a six-week hearing. It was also entitled to weigh the age and complexity of the allegations, the repeated collapse of the claimant’s health as hearing dates approached, and the prejudice to the respondent and its witnesses from another adjournment. Fairness required consideration of both parties’ rights to a fair hearing, with reasonable expedition.
4. Hendricks v MPC [2003] IRLR 96 showed that a tribunal may have to deal with alleged discriminatory conduct extending over many years, but it did not establish that a complex factual claim must always be tried after such a period.
5. The Tribunal was within its discretion to strike out the claim as a whole. It was not required to salvage the notice-pay, pension-contribution or holiday-pay issues in the claimant’s absence, particularly where those issues were not shown to be truly self-contained and partial adjudication might have generated further procedural disputes.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Permission to appeal refused against the Employment Tribunal’s substantive strike-out decision, the review decisions and the costs order: [2017] EWCA Civ 1820.
2. Employment Appeal Tribunal — Elisabeth Laing J dismissed the appeal against the substantive Employment Tribunal decision and refused a review; costs of £100 were ordered. Citation: UKEAT/0151/15/MC.
3. Employment Tribunal — On 3 February 2014 the claim was struck out under rules 47 and 37(1)(e), and the review application was later refused.
4. Earlier Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings — The first strike-out decision in February 2011 was reversed and the matter remitted to the Employment Tribunal.