Patrick v McKinley

An appellate court should approach a challenge to a trial judge’s findings of primary fact with great caution. It should interfere only where the judge was plainly wrong. In the absence of an identifiable error, such as a material error of law, a critical finding without evidential basis, a demonstrable misunderstanding or failure to consider relevant evidence, the decision must be one that cannot reasonably be explained or justified. Evidence of later events may be relevant to earlier alleged assurances only where it sheds light on whether they were made or bears on credibility. Strict limits apply to credibility challenges to prevent satellite litigation. Mere disagreement with a trial judge’s evaluation of extensive oral and documentary evidence is insufficient.

The appellant claimed a beneficial interest in two freehold properties and in shares in a company owning a third property. He relied on alleged oral promises and assurances said to have been made by the respondent in 2003 and 2004. In the alternative, he claimed payment on a quantum meruit basis for work done on the properties.

After a 12-day trial, HH Judge Gerald, sitting in the County Court at Central London, dismissed both claims. The appellant appealed on grounds alleging errors in the assessment of credibility, analysis of evidence, and the treatment of evidence concerning the parties’ relationship, later events, payments, and computer hard drives. The central issue was whether the judge’s factual findings were plainly wrong.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice David Richards gave the judgment, with which Lord Lloyd-Jones agreed. The appeal concerned findings of fact, and no dispute existed about the legal principles governing the underlying proprietary and quantum meruit claims.
2. An appellate court must be cautious before disturbing primary findings of fact. In McGraddie v McGraddie [2013] UKSC 58; [2013] 1 WLR 2477, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that intervention requires the trial judge to have been plainly wrong. Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 illustrated the exceptional nature of such intervention. In Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] UKSC 41; [2014] 1 WLR 2600, the Supreme Court explained that, absent an identifiable error, intervention is justified only where the decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified.
3. The core issue was whether the alleged promises and assurances had been made in 2003 and 2004. Later evidence could assist only if it shed light on that issue or affected credibility. It was not legitimate to litigate later events solely to attack credibility beyond the strict limits required to avoid satellite litigation. The judge was entitled to treat later aspects of the relationship, including alleged violence, as background rather than as determinative of the promises.
4. The judge’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence and acceptance of the respondent’s evidence were supported by extensive oral evidence, contemporaneous documents, and reliable independent witnesses. The appellant’s statements in family, bankruptcy, and benefit proceedings were materially inconsistent with his case at trial. The appellate submissions amounted to a reargument of the evidence and did not establish any identifiable error or plainly wrong conclusion.
5. The judge was also entitled to reject the allegation that the respondent had removed hard drives. There was no adequate evidence that the drives were present when she attended the storage facility, and the available expert material did not establish when or by whom they had been removed. In any event, the alleged contents would not have materially affected the issues concerning the 2003–2004 assurances or the appellant’s lack of project-management expertise.
6. The quantum meruit claim likewise disclosed no basis for appellate intervention. The judge found that the appellant performed manual work within his employment or under separate invoices which had been paid, while other work was undertaken in the context of the personal relationship without an expectation of further payment. It was unnecessary and futile to assign precise values to that work and the benefits received.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed. [2017] EWCA Civ 2068.
• County Court at Central London: HH Judge Gerald dismissed the claims for proprietary interests and, alternatively, payment on a quantum meruit basis.