Secretary of State for the Home Department v SC (Jamaica)

[2017] EWCA Civ 2112

Case details

Case citations
[2017] EWCA Civ 2112 · [2018] 1 WLR 4004 · [2017] WLR(D) 852
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
20 December 2017
Judgment text

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Subjects
Immigration Human rights Internal relocation
Keywords
automatic deportation foreign criminals Article 3 ECHR Article 8 ECHR internal relocation undue harshness paragraph 399A lawful residence social and cultural integration
Outcome
appeal allowed; determinations set aside and matter remitted to the first-tier tribunal for rehearing
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Internal relocation requires a tribunal to identify the proposed location, assess whether the person would face a real risk of serious harm there, and then decide whether relocation would be reasonable and not unduly harsh. The final assessment is holistic, fact-sensitive and must have an evidential foundation. Criminality may be relevant at that third stage, without weakening the protection against Article 3 ill-treatment. In foreign-criminal deportation cases, Article 8 must be assessed through the structured framework in Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the Immigration Rules. For paragraph 399A, “most of his life” means more than half, and lawful residence may run from the date of an asylum application where temporary admission was followed by leave.

Factual background

The Secretary of State appealed against the Upper Tribunal’s dismissal of her appeal from a First-tier Tribunal decision allowing SC’s human-rights appeal against automatic deportation. SC, a Jamaican national and former refugee, had extensive criminal convictions. The First-tier Tribunal found that removal would breach Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, relying on risks in Jamaica, the absence of a reasonable internal-relocation alternative, SC’s integration in the United Kingdom and obstacles to integration in Jamaica. The Upper Tribunal upheld that decision, principally on the Article 3 issue. The appeal concerned the correct approach to internal relocation, the meaning of paragraph 399A of the Immigration Rules, and the statutory framework for Article 8 in foreign-criminal deportation cases.

Held

  1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed on all grounds. The determinations of the Upper Tribunal and First-tier Tribunal were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.
  2. Internal relocation. The tribunal had to determine: (i) the proposed relocation site; (ii) whether the person would face a real risk of serious harm or persecution there; and (iii) if not, whether relocation would be reasonable and not unduly harsh. The third question required a holistic value judgment based on accepted evidence concerning both the country and the individual. No separate burden or standard of proof applied to the overall reasonableness assessment, but the evaluation still required an evidential foundation. The First-tier Tribunal had considered only Kingston, had not analysed risks elsewhere in Jamaica, and had made unsupported findings about medical treatment and employment.
  3. Criminality. Criminal convictions could be relevant to the third-stage assessment of whether relocation would be unduly harsh. Considering criminality at that stage did not impermissibly import public-interest considerations into Article 3, because the tribunal had already found that the proposed location was safe. The First-tier Tribunal had failed clearly to weigh that factor.
  4. Article 8. Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the relevant Immigration Rules formed a consistent framework. The public interest in deporting foreign criminals had to be given proper weight. “Very compelling circumstances” was a high, fact-sensitive threshold, and commonplace family circumstances would generally be insufficient. The First-tier Tribunal had treated Article 8 as a freestanding exercise, balanced offending against SC’s traumatic history rather than against the statutory scheme, and misdescribed the applicable test.
  5. Paragraph 399A. “Most of his life” was quantitative and meant more than half. For this purpose, lawful residence ran from the date of the refugee application, since temporary admission was followed by a grant of leave. Social and cultural integration required a broad evaluative judgment. The First-tier Tribunal’s factual findings could be relevant, but they had not been evaluated under the correct legal framework.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal, set aside the Upper Tribunal and First-tier Tribunal determinations, and remitted the matter for rehearing.
  2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal and upheld the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
  3. First-tier Tribunal: allowed SC’s appeal against the deportation decision on Articles 3 and 8 ECHR grounds.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal allowed; determinations set aside and matter remitted to the first-tier tribunal for rehearing

Appeal to higher court

Appealed to
Outcome of appeal
appeal allowed unanimously; first-tier tribunal decision reinstated

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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