Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara

“Integration” for the purpose of section 117C(4)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and paragraph 399A of the Immigration Rules is a broad evaluative concept. It is not confined to a deportee’s ability to find work or sustain life in the receiving country. The assessment concerns whether the person will be sufficiently an insider to understand and participate in that society, operate there day to day, and form relationships giving substance to private or family life.

An immigration tribunal’s reasons are assessed conventionally and substantively. It may concentrate on the principal disputed issues, and need not expressly address an obvious and undisputed matter where its awareness and consideration of it are clear from the decision.

Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara concerned the proposed deportation to Sierra Leone of a foreign criminal who had entered the United Kingdom as a young child, held indefinite leave to remain, and had been convicted of a serious drugs offence.

The First-tier Tribunal had twice allowed his appeal, but the Upper Tribunal had set aside each decision for error of law. On the second occasion, the Upper Tribunal made the decision afresh. It found that he had no family, social or cultural links in Sierra Leone, did not speak its local languages, and was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. It allowed the appeal under Exception 1 in section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and paragraph 399A of the Immigration Rules, holding that deportation would disproportionately interfere with his Article 8 private life.

The Secretary of State appealed, contending that the Upper Tribunal had failed to take account of his youth, health and capacity for work, or had given inadequate reasons.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Upper Tribunal was entitled to find that Exception 1 applied and that deportation would be disproportionate under Article 8. Its conclusion fell within the lawful range of evaluative judgment on the evidence.

2. For section 117C(4)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and paragraph 399A of the Immigration Rules, integration is a broad concept. It is not limited to the ability to obtain work or survive in the proposed country of deportation. The inquiry is whether the individual will be enough of an insider to understand how the society operates, participate in it, function day to day, and form relationships within a reasonable time that give substance to private or family life. The statutory language should ordinarily be applied without an added gloss.

3. There is no special rule governing reasons in immigration appeals. A tribunal’s decision must be read for the substance of its reasoning, not analysed as though it were a statute. It may focus on the main matters disputed by the parties while making clear that it has considered the relevant statutory regime. The Upper Tribunal was plainly aware that Mr Kamara was young, healthy and capable of work. Those matters were not separately advanced as a principal submission, and it was not required expressly to repeat them in its reasons.

4. The Upper Tribunal permissibly treated those personal advantages as insufficient to outweigh the absence of family, social and cultural links, language ability and familiarity with life in Sierra Leone. No irrationality or perversity challenge was advanced on the footing that those matters had been considered.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara, [2016] EWCA Civ 813, dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal and upheld the Upper Tribunal’s conclusion that deportation would breach Article 8.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): After setting aside the second First-tier Tribunal decision for error of law, made the decision afresh and allowed the appeal against deportation.
• First-tier Tribunal: Allowed the appeal on two occasions. The Upper Tribunal set aside the first decision and remitted the matter; it later set aside the second decision and determined the appeal itself.