Gibson Bennett Ackom (aka Bonsu) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Under Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 section 117C(4)(c), the tribunal must make a broad, objective and fact-sensitive assessment of whether identified obstacles would prevent or seriously inhibit integration in the receiving country. The threshold is elevated, but common obstacles such as absence of family ties, unfamiliarity and inability to speak the language are not automatically determinative. The assessment must address the receiving country and the individual’s characteristics. Employment difficulties, criminal records and imprisonment cannot alone establish very significant obstacles. Where language difficulties are relied on, the tribunal should consider whether the language could be learned within a reasonable time and give sufficient reasons for its conclusion. Appellate restraint does not prevent intervention for material errors or inadequate reasoning.

The respondent, a German national of Ghanaian heritage who had lived in the United Kingdom since childhood, appealed against deportation following convictions for serious drug offences. The First-tier Tribunal allowed his human rights appeal, finding that he satisfied all three limbs of Exception 1 under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The Upper Tribunal upheld that decision. The Secretary of State brought a second appeal, challenging the finding under section 117C(4)(c) that there would be very significant obstacles to the respondent’s integration in Germany. The central issue was whether the First-tier Tribunal had properly applied the applicable test and adequately explained its conclusion.

1. Appeal allowed. Lady Justice Andrews gave the leading judgment, with Lord Justice Nugee and Lord Justice Newey agreeing. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision contained an error of law, and the matter was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before a different judge.
2. The statutory scheme treats deportation of qualifying foreign criminals as being in the public interest. For a person sentenced to less than four years’ imprisonment, deportation is required unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies under section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The respondent relied on Exception 1, and only its third limb was disputed.
3. The meaning of integration derives from Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, approved in Sanambar [2021] UKSC 30. The tribunal must make a broad evaluative judgment whether the person would be sufficiently able to understand and participate in life in the receiving society, operate there day to day, have a reasonable opportunity of acceptance, and form relationships giving substance to private or family life within a reasonable time. The threshold is elevated, as explained in Parveen [2016] EWCA Civ 932, but the court must assess the obstacles relied on rather than impose an additional gloss.
4. Absence of ties, unfamiliarity with the receiving country, lack of family or friends and inability to speak its language may suffice in an appropriate case, but they are not inevitably determinative. Much depends on the receiving country and the individual’s character and abilities. A criminal record, imprisonment and resulting employment difficulties cannot themselves amount to very significant obstacles, particularly where benefits prevent destitution. If inability to speak the language is given substantial weight, the tribunal must address whether the person could learn it within a reasonable time.
5. The First-tier Tribunal did not sufficiently explain why a fit, reasonably intelligent young person with education, work experience and transferable skills would be prevented or seriously inhibited from integrating into Germany. It did not adequately address participation in German society, day-to-day operation, acceptance or the formation of relationships. Its bare reference to Germany as a European country was insufficient, particularly since life there was not significantly different from life in the United Kingdom.
6. An appellate court should not use a fine-tooth comb when reviewing a specialist tribunal’s decision. It may, however, intervene where there is a gap in logic, inconsistency, failure to consider a material factor or inadequate reasons. It was unnecessary to decide the alternative irrationality ground or the First-tier Tribunal’s fallback reasoning.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2025] EWCA Civ 537: allowed the Secretary of State’s second appeal, set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision for error of law, and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing before a different judge.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): on 27 March 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Stephen Smith found no error of law and upheld the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
3. First-tier Tribunal: on 6 September 2023, First-tier Tribunal Judge Rodger allowed the respondent’s human rights appeal, finding that Exception 1 under section 117C(4) was satisfied.