Sanambar v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Deporting a settled migrant who entered the host country as a child requires a delicate and holistic assessment of the relevant article 8 criteria. The requirement for “very serious reasons” is a summary of the weight produced by that assessment, especially where offending occurred as a juvenile. It is not a separate condition which must be satisfied after the conventional proportionality balance.

“Integration” into the receiving country requires a broad evaluative judgment. The question extends beyond subsistence and employment to whether the person can understand and participate in society, operate from day to day, gain acceptance and build human relationships within a reasonable time.

The appellant, an Iranian national, entered the United Kingdom lawfully aged nine and obtained indefinite leave to remain. Between the ages of 14 and 17 he committed repeated offences culminating in violent knifepoint robberies, for which he received three years’ detention. The Secretary of State decided that his deportation was conducive to the public good.

The First-tier Tribunal initially allowed his appeal. The Upper Tribunal subsequently reheard the case under the amended statutory framework and dismissed it. The Court of Appeal dismissed a further appeal in [2017] EWCA Civ 1284.

The issues before the Supreme Court were whether “very serious reasons” constituted a separate requirement when deporting a settled migrant who had spent most of childhood in the United Kingdom, and whether the Upper Tribunal had correctly assessed the existence of very significant obstacles to integration in Iran.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Sir Declan Morgan, with whom Lord Reed, Lord Hodge, Lord Sales and Lord Stephens agreed, held that the Upper Tribunal had conducted the required article 8 proportionality assessment and had given relevant and sufficient reasons for finding deportation proportionate.

2. Paragraph 75 of Maslov v Austria did not create a separate condition requiring the state to establish “very serious reasons” after applying the four Üner/Maslov criteria. It summarised the implications of those criteria. Their weight depends upon the circumstances, including whether the migrant arrived during childhood and whether the offences were committed as a juvenile. The correct approach remains the conventional balancing exercise between private and family life and the public interest in preventing disorder or crime.

3. The expulsion of a settled migrant who has lived almost all of his or her life in the host country requires a delicate and holistic assessment. The decision must be supported by relevant and sufficient reasons. The Upper Tribunal properly considered the seriousness of the appellant’s planned violent robberies, his youth when offending, his established life in the United Kingdom, the time elapsed, rehabilitation and his continuing medium risk of serious harm.

4. Under section 117 C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the public interest required deportation unless the statutory exception applied or very compelling circumstances outweighed that interest. The exception failed because the obstacles to integration in Iran were not very significant.

5. Applying Kamara v Home Office, integration required a broad evaluative judgment. It was not confined to finding employment or sustaining life. The Upper Tribunal properly weighed the appellant’s long absence from Iran, limited literacy and lack of relatives against his spoken Farsi, intelligence, adaptability, familiarity with Iranian culture and potential point of contact through his mother’s friend. There was ample material for its conclusion.

6. The assessment underpinning deportation was more than five years old. Since deportation must reflect circumstances at the time it occurs, section 5(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 and the Immigration Rules provided a mechanism through which the appellant could rely upon any material change of circumstances.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: Dismissed the appeal unanimously and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision in [2017] EWCA Civ 1284.
2. Court of Appeal: Dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the Upper Tribunal.
3. Upper Tribunal: Allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal because the First-tier Tribunal had used the superseded 2012 Rules, reheard the case with agreed findings preserved, and dismissed the appellant’s deportation appeal.
4. First-tier Tribunal: Initially allowed the appellant’s appeal against deportation.