Mohammed Sury Dabo v Secretary of State for The Home Department

Social and cultural integration requires a holistic assessment of a foreign criminal’s relationships, affiliations and identity at the date of the hearing. Offending and imprisonment matter through their actual effects on legitimate ties. There is no mandatory chronological inquiry into whether integration was broken and subsequently restored.

The assessment of very significant obstacles to integration requires consideration of whether identified obstacles would prevent or seriously inhibit integration in the receiving country. Further explanation may be unnecessary where their seriousness is self-evident and the findings substantively address that threshold.

A tribunal’s concise reasons must be read in context. An unusually generous factual assessment, or the absence of an express statement describing every analytical step, does not itself establish an error of law.

Mr Dabo, a Guinean national, entered the United Kingdom aged 16 as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child. His asylum claims failed, and he remained unlawfully after exhausting his appeal rights in 2011. Following persistent offending, he received a sentence of two years and eight months’ imprisonment for possessing Class A drugs with intent to supply. The Secretary of State refused his protection and human rights claims and made a deportation order.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed his protection appeal but allowed his Article 8 private life appeal. Although neither statutory exception to deportation was satisfied, it found very compelling circumstances. Its findings included social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom and very significant obstacles to integration in Guinea. The Upper Tribunal dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal.

The Secretary of State appealed to the Court of Appeal, challenging the treatment of offending in the integration assessment and the assessment of the seriousness of obstacles in Guinea. The ultimate conclusion on very compelling circumstances was not separately challenged. The parties agreed that a material error in either assessment would require a fresh overall assessment.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Andrews LJ gave the substantive judgment, with which Zacaroli and Moylan LJJ agreed. Neither challenged assessment disclosed an error of law.

1. A foreign criminal sentenced to imprisonment for between 12 months and four years could resist deportation through very compelling circumstances even where neither statutory exception applied. The extent to which individual requirements of the exceptions were satisfied remained relevant to the strength of private or family life and the interference caused by deportation. The interpretation established in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department supplied that statutory framework (paras 15–16).

2. Under CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, social and cultural integration required a holistic assessment at the date of the hearing. Offending and imprisonment were relevant through their actual effects on relationships, affiliations and social identity. Association with criminals or pro-criminal groups could not establish integration into lawful society. However, Binbuga v Secretary of State for the Home Department imposed no requirement to examine integration chronologically for a break followed by restoration. The inquiry concerned the individual’s current integration, taking account of all relevant circumstances (paras 35–41).

3. The First-tier Tribunal could have explained the impact of offending more fully. Nevertheless, its reasons addressed the position at the hearing, referred to repeated offending and homelessness, and showed that those matters had been weighed against the evidence of integration. Their brevity did not justify an inference that the required assessment had been omitted. The Upper Tribunal correctly rejected the first ground (paras 42–44).

4. Identifying obstacles to integration was insufficient unless their seriousness was assessed. The question was whether they would prevent or seriously inhibit integration. Unlike the deficient assessment in Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the findings here substantively answered that question. Where the seriousness of the obstacles was self-evident, further explanation was unnecessary (paras 46–49).

5. The finding that Mr Dabo would lack a reasonable opportunity for acceptance and daily functioning in Guinea was reinforced by the absence of family support in a society reliant on kinship structures. Findings concerning lack of resources, accommodation and employment, likely deterioration in mental health and possible destitution provided further support. The second ground therefore also failed, and the Upper Tribunal’s decision stood (paras 50–52).

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2026] EWCA Civ 907 , dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal on both grounds and upheld the Upper Tribunal’s decision.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s allowance of the Article 8 appeal. No judgment citation is stated.
3. First-tier Tribunal: Following a hearing on 5 June 2023, promulgated its decision on 18 August 2023. It dismissed the protection appeal but allowed the appeal against deportation on Article 8 private life grounds. There was no appeal against the rejection of the protection claim.