Chadha v HM Senior Coronor for West London

For the statutory duty to investigate a death, Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provisions concerning state detention are directed to compulsory detention involving coercive state powers. A patient in a persistent vegetative state who cannot move, lacks capacity to consent and receives treatment on a best-interests basis is not thereby in state detention. The deprivation-of-liberty inquiry remains fact-sensitive, but physical inability to leave hospital differs from confinement in a restrictive place and being legally unable to leave. Where the lower court made no legal error and an appeal had no real prospect of success, permission to appeal was refused.

Mrs Chadha fell at home in 2011, suffered injuries resulting in a persistent vegetative state and remained in hospital until her death in 2015. The coroner discontinued the investigation after recording a natural cause of death. Mr Chadha sought judicial review of that decision, arguing that the coroner had reason to suspect that his wife had died in state detention under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Sir Stephen Silber, sitting as a judge of the High Court, dismissed the application for permission to apply for judicial review on 16 December 2016. The renewed application concerned whether hospital treatment, incapacity and inability to leave required continuation of the investigation. The Court of Appeal considered whether the proposed appeal disclosed an arguable legal error with a real prospect of success.

Permission refused. Lady Justice Sharp agreed with Simon LJ and Sir Stephen Silber that the proposed appeal disclosed no legal error and had no real prospect of success.

1. Section 4(2)(b) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 was concerned with situations involving the coercive powers of the state. The statutory concept of state detention was not extended to a patient receiving hospital treatment in a persistent vegetative state.
2. Under section 48(2) of the 2009 Act, state detention required compulsory detention by a public authority. Mrs Chadha’s inability to move, lack of capacity to consent, best-interests treatment and the request for a deprivation-of-liberty authorisation did not establish that she was compulsorily detained. The request had not been processed, and an authorisation would not by itself prove actual deprivation of liberty.
3. The approach in P (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) v Cheshire West and Chester Council & Anor [2014] UKSC 19 identified the relevant deprivation-of-liberty features, including confinement in a particular restrictive place and lack of freedom to leave. That approach did not make physical inability to leave equivalent to compulsory detention. The reasoning in The Queen (on the Application of LF) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London & Anor [2015] EWHC 2990 was strongly persuasive on the analogous issue.
4. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.

Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2017] EWCA Civ 2710, Lady Justice Sharp refused the renewed application for permission to appeal.

High Court: Sir Stephen Silber, sitting as a judge of the High Court, dismissed the application for permission to apply for judicial review by order dated 16 December 2016.