Trindade v London Borough of Hackney

For Housing Act 1996, s 191(2), a relevant fact must exist when the applicant deliberately gives up accommodation. A mistaken expectation about a future event is insufficient. A present belief about future housing prospects may qualify only where it concerns a specific prospect and rests on genuine investigation rather than aspiration.

Good faith concerns the applicant’s housing position and accommodation needs. A laudable personal motive does not itself establish good faith. Reckless disregard of housing prospects, or shutting one’s eyes to the obvious need for accommodation, prevents reliance on the subsection.

The appellant left her home in São Tomé with her disabled daughter to seek medical treatment in the United Kingdom. She stayed with her sister until the sister’s tenancy ended. The local housing authority decided that she had become intentionally homeless after deliberately leaving her former accommodation.

A reviewing officer upheld that decision under s 202 of the Housing Act 1996. HHJ Wulwik dismissed the appellant’s subsequent s 204 appeal in the Central London County Court. The appellant appealed on the grounds that she had been unaware of a relevant fact when she left São Tomé and that she had acted in good faith.

The central issue was the scope of the protection in s 191(2), particularly where anticipated future accommodation proves unavailable.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. The court held that the appellant could not rely on s 191(2) of the Housing Act 1996. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Najim, [2015] EWCA Civ 319, was binding and correctly stated the law. The subsection concerns ignorance of a fact existing when the applicant performs the deliberate act under s 191(1). It does not cover a mistaken prediction about a future event.

2. Where an applicant leaves accommodation in expectation of future housing or employment, the relevant present fact is the objective quality of the prospects at that time. To establish ignorance of that fact, the applicant must have an active belief in a specific future state of affairs, founded on genuine investigation rather than mere aspiration. This approach was consistent with R v Westminster City Council, ex p Obeid, (1996) 29 HLR 389, and the later authorities which endorsed it.

3. The reviewing officer was entitled to find that the appellant had made no proper investigation of her accommodation prospects in the United Kingdom. She knew only that she could initially stay with her sister, with no agreed duration or offer of permanent housing. Her position was therefore analogous to Aw-Aden, [2005] EWCA Civ 1834: the prospects rested on little more than hope. She was not unaware of a relevant fact within s 191(2).

4. Obiter, because the first ground disposed of the appeal, good faith under s 191(2) is assessed within the statutory housing scheme. It concerns the applicant’s conduct towards housing needs, not a worthy personal reason for moving. A person who recklessly disregards housing prospects, or shuts her eyes to the obvious need for accommodation, does not act in good faith. The reviewing officer’s conclusion on that basis was lawful.

5. The court added that, in cases concerning future prospects, satisfying the genuine-investigation requirement will almost always also establish good faith in relation to housing needs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the county court’s decision: [2017] EWCA Civ 942.
• Central London County Court On 29 July 2015, HHJ Wulwik dismissed the appellant’s appeal under s 204 of the Housing Act 1996 and upheld the reviewing officer’s intentional-homelessness assessment.
• London Borough of Hackney A review decision under s 202, dated 22 December 2014, confirmed the original assessment under s 184, dated 14 April 2014.