Piruz, R. v

When fixing a life-sentence minimum term, the court must assess the seriousness of attempted violence by reference to intended harm as well as injury actually caused. Concurrent sentences may properly exceed the guideline range for a single offence where needed to reflect the total criminality.

An early guilty plea normally attracts one-third credit. Overwhelming evidence alone is insufficient reason to reduce that credit. The post-plea notional determinate sentence must then be reduced by half to reflect the early-release regime for determinate prisoners, rather than by reference to a hypothetical extended sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Lewes Crown Court to domestic garage burglary, two counts of attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent, and affray. He had attacked police officers with a hammer, intending serious injury, although the physical injuries caused were limited.

He received life sentences for the two attempted section 18 offences, with a five-year minimum term. His challenge to the life sentences was not pursued. The appeal concerned only the length and calculation of the minimum term, including the application of sentencing guidelines, guilty-plea credit, and early-release provisions.

1. The appeal was allowed in part. The court reduced the minimum term for the life sentences from five years to three years, effective from 13 January 2017. The remaining sentences were unchanged.

2. The judge was entitled to treat the offending as more serious than an assessment based only on the injuries actually inflicted. Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 143, seriousness includes harm intended or foreseeably caused. These were attempts to inflict very serious injury with a hammer on two officers. Serious injury was avoided through the officers’ actions, protective equipment and good fortune. The twelve-year notional determinate sentence was stiff but not manifestly excessive.

3. Concurrent sentences were appropriate because the offences arose from one incident. That did not confine the overall sentence to the guideline range for a single offence. The total sentence had to reflect the full criminality, including attacks on two officers, the weapon, the persistence of the attack, and the appellant’s previous murder conviction.

4. The judge erred in allowing only 25 per cent credit for the early guilty pleas. Although the evidence was overwhelming, that did not itself justify departure from the normal one-third reduction.

5. The judge also erred in reducing the post-plea term by one-third by reference to a hypothetical extended sentence. Section 82 A(3)(c) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 required comparison with the early-release provisions for a determinate sentence under section 244(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. That approach accorded with R v Burinskas, Attorney-General’s Reference No 27 of 2013, [2014] EWCA Crim 334. The twelve years were reduced by one-third to eight years, then by half to four years, and finally by one year for time on remand.

The reduction affected only eligibility for consideration by the Parole Board. It did not guarantee release.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): allowed the sentence appeal in part and substituted a three-year minimum term: [2017] EWCA Crim 1292.
• Crown Court at Lewes: on 13 January 2017 imposed life sentences for the two attempted grievous bodily harm offences, with a five-year minimum term.