Martin, R. v

A judge should leave the statutory partial defence of loss of control to a jury only where sufficient evidence permits a properly directed jury reasonably to conclude that it might apply. The assessment requires a rigorous evaluation of all the evidence. Self-defence does not of itself raise loss of control. Evidence that a defendant was frightened, panicked or responding to aggression does not necessarily show an actual loss of self-control.

Where there is no such evidence, the jury need not consider a qualifying trigger or the objective requirement in section 54(1)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. In fixing a minimum term for murder, the court must apply the statutory starting point but may adjust it for mitigation, aggravation and totality.

The appellant was convicted at Preston Crown Court of murdering Kyle Hand, a close friend. Following an alcohol-fuelled confrontation, the appellant stabbed the victim repeatedly. His case at trial was that he acted in self-defence and lacked intent. Although the trial judge raised loss of control with counsel, counsel ultimately agreed that the evidence did not raise that partial defence.

The jury unanimously convicted the appellant of murder. He received life imprisonment with a minimum term of 27 years, together with concurrent sentences for a separate section 18 offence and knife possession. He appealed against conviction on the ground that loss of control should have been left to the jury, and against the minimum term as excessive.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to conclude that loss of control had not been raised, notwithstanding counsel's agreement with that conclusion and the absence of a reasoned ruling. The appellate court independently considered whether sufficient evidence had been adduced under sections 54(5) and 54(6) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

2. Loss of control and self-defence are distinct. A case advanced as self-defence may, on suitable facts, also raise loss of control, but one does not follow from the other. Before the issue can be left to the jury, there must be evidence that the defendant actually lost self-control. Only then need the court consider a qualifying trigger and the objective requirement in section 54(1)(c).

3. There was no evidence of loss of self-control in this case. The prosecution evidence showed an aggressive confrontation and retaliation. The appellant's own evidence was that he was struck with a hammer, chased, frightened, in shock and panicked. That evidence was relevant to self-defence, but did not itself establish loss of self-control. The court therefore did not determine whether there was a qualifying trigger or whether a person with normal tolerance and self-restraint might have reacted similarly.

4. The appeal against sentence was allowed. The 25-year starting point under Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 correctly applied because the appellant took the knife from the house to the street where he used it. However, the circumstances of the murder justified a lower term before allowing for the separate serious section 18 offence. Applying totality, the court quashed the 27-year minimum term and substituted 24 years less time spent on remand. The concurrent sentences remained in force.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The appeal against sentence was allowed and the minimum term was reduced: [2017] EWCA Crim 1359.

• Crown Court at Preston: On 29 September 2016, the appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 27-year minimum term, less time on remand.