Taylor, R. v

A restraining order following an acquittal under section 5A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 requires a proper evidential basis for concluding that the defendant is likely to pursue a future course of conduct amounting to harassment. The order must also be truly necessary to protect the person concerned; that statutory requirement must not be diluted because breach is criminal.

Isolated and non-targeted conduct, without evidence of past harassment or likely repetition, will not meet that threshold. The court imposing the order must identify its factual basis and state its reasons.

The applicant was unanimously acquitted at Liverpool Crown Court of burglary at licensed premises. Following the acquittal, the same judge made a three-year restraining order preventing contact with the complainant, attendance at the public house and pedestrian passage along its road.

The prosecution relied on the complainant's understandable concern after the applicant had hidden in the premises overnight and behaved unusually. The applicant appealed, contending that there was no evidence of prior or likely future harassment, or of conduct targeted at the complainant, and that the judge had not identified a factual basis for the order.

The central issue was whether the statutory threshold for a restraining order after acquittal had been met.

1. Appeal allowed. The court granted leave and quashed the restraining order.

2. Under section 5A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, an order after acquittal requires the court first to be satisfied that the defendant is likely to pursue a course of conduct amounting to harassment within section 1. Applying Smith [2012] EWCA Crim 2566, the statutory requirement of necessity is stringent. An order restricting otherwise lawful conduct, breach of which is criminal, is justified only where it is truly necessary to protect another person.

3. The conduct in this case was bizarre and understandably alarming. It was nevertheless an isolated incident occurring over one night. There was no evidence that the applicant knew or had targeted the complainant, had harassed her previously, or was likely to repeat the conduct. Those facts could not support the required conclusion that a future harassing course of conduct was likely.

4. The court also applied the procedural guidance in R v Jinny Jose [2013] EWCA Crim 939. A judge imposing an order after acquittal must identify the factual basis for it and state reasons. The prosecution had not assisted the judge with the relevant authorities, and the judge had not undertaken that analysis. The applicant's criticisms were well founded.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal and quashed the restraining order: [2017] EWCA Crim 2209.

• Liverpool Crown Court: The applicant was unanimously acquitted of burglary on 15 June 2017. On 6 July 2017, the trial judge made a three-year restraining order following that acquittal.