Eisa, R v

A trial judge must give clear directions on the legal ingredients of each offence and focus any direction on adverse inferences from silence upon the particular failure relied on by the prosecution. The judge must also give the jury an intelligible and structured summary of the evidence relevant to the issues they must decide.

Where disputed expert handwriting evidence is material, the jury should be reminded accurately of that evidence. They should not be left to assume the role of experts by making their own document comparison without an appropriate and careful direction.

The appellant was convicted at Croydon Crown Court of theft of a motor vehicle and fraud by falsely representing to the DVLA that the vehicle had been transferred to him. The prosecution alleged that he retained the vehicle logbook, forged the owner’s signature, and registered himself as owner. The appellant maintained that he had agreed to buy the vehicle and that the owner had signed the documents.

The case turned on disputed factual evidence, including handwriting evidence concerning signatures on a logbook and an alleged receipt. The appellant appealed against conviction and sentence, contending that the Recorder’s summing-up failed adequately to direct the jury or summarise the evidence. The central issue was whether the deficiencies in the summing-up rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal allowed; convictions quashed. Although the trial was short and the factual issues were capable of simple identification, the court could not be satisfied that the jury had been safely left to determine them.

2. The Recorder’s directions on the law were insufficient. He did not explain the legal ingredients of theft and fraud, nor identify matters which were agreed or capable of determining guilt if proved. His later attempt at clarification was confusing and did not cure the omission.

3. The direction under section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 should have been confined to the appellant’s failure, at his first interview, to mention the alleged receipt. The direction instead risked suggesting that an adverse inference could be drawn merely because the appellant later amplified matters mentioned briefly in the first interview.

4. The factual summing-up was diffuse and unstructured. It did not clearly remind the jury of the evidence central to the disputed issues, as required by rule 25.14 of the Criminal Procedure Rules.

5. The Recorder also failed to remind the jury accurately of the handwriting expert’s differing conclusions on the two disputed documents. His comments could have led jurors to think that they might themselves undertake an expert comparison of the signatures. Such an approach would be dangerous and, if permissible at all, would require a particularly careful direction.

6. Leave to appeal against conviction was granted and the appeal allowed. The convictions were quashed. The application concerning sentence consequently fell away. The Crown did not seek a retrial.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against conviction and quashed the convictions: [2017] EWCA Crim 2314.
• Crown Court at Croydon: Convicted the appellant of theft and fraud on 11 May 2017 and imposed a suspended sentence for fraud on 12 May 2017.